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ABSTRACT
Computer networks are constantly being attacked by malicious entities for various
reasons. Network based attacks include but are not limited to, Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS), DNS based attacks, Cross-site Scripting (XSS) etc. Such attacks have exploited
either the network protocol or the end-host software vulnerabilities for perpetration. Cur-
rent network traffic analysis techniques employed for detection and/or prevention of these
anomalies suffer from significant delay or have only limited scalability because of their
huge resource requirements. This dissertation proposes more scalable techniques for net-
work anomaly detection.
We propose using DNS analysis for detecting a wide variety of network anomalies.
The use of DNS is motivated by the fact that DNS traffic comprises only 2-3% of total net-
work traffic reducing the burden on anomaly detection resources. Our motivation addition-
ally follows from the observation that almost any Internet activity (legitimate or otherwise)
is marked by the use of DNS. We propose several techniques for DNS traffic analysis to
distinguish anomalous DNS traffic patterns which in turn identify different categories of
network attacks.
First, we present MiND, a system to detect misdirected DNS packets arising due to
poisoned name server records or due to local infections such as caused by worms like
DNSChanger. MiND validates misdirected DNS packets using an externally collected
database of authoritative name servers for second or third-level domains. We deploy this
tool at the edge of a university campus network for evaluation.
Secondly, we focus on domain-fluxing botnet detection by exploiting the high entropy
inherent in the set of domains used for locating the Command and Control (C&C) server.
We apply three metrics namely the Kullback-Leibler divergence, the Jaccard Index, and
the Edit distance, to different groups of domain names present in Tier-1 ISP DNS traces
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obtained from South Asia and South America. Our evaluation successfully detects existing
domain-fluxing botnets such as Conficker and also recognizes new botnets. We extend this
approach by utilizing DNS failures to improve the latency of detection. Alternatively, we
propose a system which uses temporal and entropy-based correlation between successful
and failed DNS queries, for fluxing botnet detection.
We also present an approach which computes the reputation of domains in a bipar-
tite graph of hosts within a network, and the domains accessed by them. The inference
technique utilizes belief propagation, an approximation algorithm for marginal probability
estimation. The computation of reputation scores is seeded through a small fraction of do-
mains found in black and white lists. An application of this technique, on an HTTP-proxy
dataset from a large enterprise, shows a high detection rate with low false positive rates.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Networks around the world are subject to constant barrage of attacks that exploit either the
end host (victim’s) application or network protocol vulnerabilities. While attacks exploiting
host software vulnerabilities include DNS misdirection, XSS (Cross Site Scripting) based
attacks, malware infections for click-jacking, botnet expansion, etc., network attacks such
as Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Domain Name System
(DNS) cache poisoning, DNS amplification, etc., belong to the latter category. In particular,
the botnet based attacks have seen a surge in activity in the recent past, where several
thousand bots coordinate from different parts of the world to achieve a considerable scale
for malicious activities such as for spamming, phishing, or DDoS attacks.
Identifying infected hosts or malicious network traffic is imperative for protecting user
information such as passwords, credit card details, other confidential information, or for
prevention of previously mentioned attacks. Many of the attacks require communication
with external rogue entities. For instance, bots (machines infected with malware) commu-
nicate with a Command and Control (C&C) server either for retrieving instructions or for
transferring the data stolen from victims. These communication patterns, if distinguish-
able from legitimate network traffic, can potentially lead to the detection of infected bots
and the C&C servers coordinating the bots. In this work, we focus on developing several
mechanisms which exploit or mine such differences for anomaly detection.
Previous approaches for such anomaly detection have deployed blacklisting mecha-
nisms, honeypot/honeynet systems, or perform complete network traffic analysis. In the
context of botnet detection, blacklist based solutions offer information about IP addresses
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acting as bots spewing spam, or the addresses of C&C servers herding the botnets. In addi-
tion, domain names which help locate the commonly observed rogue hosts (servers in most
cases) may also be present in the blacklist. Using blacklists, however, incurs significant
delay in terms of identifying the corresponding rogue domain name or IP address, and for
establishing ample community confidence for blacklisting.
A honeypot system refers to the deliberate infection of a pristine user system such that
the installed malware assumes its presence on a regular system. The infected system is
generally a virtual machine with controlled network access to avoid the spread of malware
within the network. Honeypots help understand the mode of operation of malware so that
signatures expressing this behavior can be developed for future detection. Once the analysis
using a honeypot is complete, the infected system image is erased or reset. While effective
in the recent past, honeypot systems require significant manual work for setting up virtual
machines. Such a solution additionally suffers from the drawback of malware being able to
recognize its presence within a virtual machine (VM) rendering the honeypot system inef-
fective. The virtual machines are identified when malware searches for memory footprints
or configuration specific registry entries at pre-determined locations. Malware can stop
propagating itself to such VM-based honeypots in order to evade detection. At present,
security researchers discover at least 1000 malware samples equipped with VM-detection
capability every week [1].
Approaches which look at the complete network traffic include techniques which uti-
lize machine learning or correlation techniques for anomaly detection [2, 3]. Such an ap-
proach suffers from the problem of scalability as a reliable analysis requires considerable
resources even for small-sized networks (such as a university campus). Counter strategies
to complete network traffic analysis have explored network sampling where only a fraction
of the traffic is analyzed. Sampling based methods, however, result in many false negatives
due to missed communication traffic which translates to a low reliability [4].
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To ensure network protection while overcoming drawbacks of previous approaches,
we propose analyzing DNS traffic for anomaly detection. The analysis of DNS traffic is
motivated by the following. DNS comprises of only about 2-3% of the total network traffic.
While there are several communication protocols available for use, malware uses the DNS
for initiating any type of communication with an external malicious actor. Note that the
alternative use of hard-coded rogue server IP addresses is antiquated and easily detectable
through reverse engineering or controlled network analysis. The use of DNS, thus, provides
footprints of anomalous communication which may then be identified through statistical
techniques as proposed in this work. In addition, the protocol specific information that
needs to be analyzed is relatively less compared to other application layer protocols such
as HTTP, SMTP, etc. Therefore, we develop techniques utilizing DNS for detection and
subsequent prevention of a wide variety of anomalies.
First, we present MiND, a tool to detect DNS packet indirection attacks within an au-
tonomous system (AS) which arise due to infections caused by malware such as DNSChanger
[5]. MiND uses a name server database to detect misdirected DNS queries by examining
only the network layer information. The name server database uses publicly available DNS
PTR and NS records to populate itself. The validity and authenticity of name server in-
formation is ensured through continuous updates. Using our tool, we detect the presence
of malicious misdirections within our autonomous system with a performance that results
in a false positive rate of less than 0.8%, with improved query verification latency when
compared to prior solutions. We deploy MiND as an online analysis tool without requiring
significant infrastructure upgrade or coordination from different entities.
Our second work focusses on the detection of domain fluxing botnets. A botnet refers
to a network of compromised hosts (or bots) which communicate with a C&C server for
instructions. The C&C server instructs the bot to either spam a list of email addresses,
steal victim’s private data, or assist in launching a DDoS attack. The botnets are of mainly
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two types viz. Peer-to-Peer based botnets or Central Command and Control based botnets.
The difference lies in that the server (disemminating instructions) does not have a fixed
location in the P2P architecture. Centralized C&C servers allow for an easier control but
several approaches have been proposed to detect them. As a consequence, recent botnets
have employed evasion methodologies that include frequently changing the IP address of
the C&C server (also called IP fluxing) and more recently, frequently changing the domain
names which resolve to the C&C server (called Domain fluxing).
Recent Botnets such as Conficker, Kraken and Torpig have used DNS based “domain
fluxing” for command-and-control, where each bot queries for existence of a series of do-
main names and the owner has to register only one such domain name. From the point of
view of a botnet owner, the economics work out quite well. They only have to register one
or a few domains out of the several domains that each bot would query every day. Whereas,
security vendors would have to pre-register all the domains that a bot queries every day,
even before the botnet owner registers them, to thwart the communication between the bot
and the C&C server. In all the cases above, the security vendors had to reverse engineer
the bot executable to derive the exact algorithm being used for generating domain names.
In some cases, their algorithm would predict domains successfully until the botnet owner
would patch all the bots with a re-purposed executable with a different domain generation
algorithm [6].
In the second part of this work, we develop a methodology to detect such “domain
fluxes” in DNS traffic by looking for patterns inherent to domain names that are generated
algorithmically, in contrast to those generated by humans. In particular, we look at distribu-
tion of alphanumeric characters as well as bigrams in the domain names at different levels.
We present and compare the performance of several metrics, including K-L distance, Edit
distance and Jaccard measure, for distinguishing algorithmic generated names from human
generated names. We train by using a good data set of domains obtained via a crawl of
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domains mapped to all IPv4 address space and modeling bad data sets based on behaviors
seen so far and expected. We apply our methodology to packet traces collected at a Tier-1
ISP and show that we can automatically detect domain fluxing as used by Conficker and
other botnets with minimal false positives.
Botnets such as Conficker and Torpig utilize domain names with high alphanumeric
entropy for fluxing and evasion. Bots may query a large number of domains, some of which
may fail. In this extension of our fluxing botnet detection approach, we present techniques
where the failed domain queries (NXDOMAIN) may be utilized for: (i) Speeding up the
detection strategies which rely only on successful DNS queries. (ii) Detecting Command
and Control (C&C) server addresses through features such as temporal correlation and
information entropy of domain names of both successful and failed DNS queries. We
apply our technique to a Tier-1 ISP dataset obtained from South Asia, and a campus DNS
trace to validate our methods, detecting Conficker botnet IPs and other anomalies with false
positive rates as low as 0.02%. Our technique can be applied at the edge of an autonomous
system for real-time detection of fluxing botnets.
In the last part of this dissertation, we attempt to identify a wider variety of anoma-
lies through graph inference techniques. Malware infections within a network are spawned
and spread primarily through domains accessed by network clients. Thus, containment of
infected hosts and prevention of access to malicious domains is critical for every network.
Reliably identifying infected hosts and malicious domains, however, is challenging. Mod-
ern malware such as rootkits may evade anti-virus products and other host-based analysis
techniques. Similarly, identification via network and communication traffic analysis is dif-
ficult as botnet communication by design tries to mimic legitimate applications [3]. Many
enterprises use blacklists to identify and prevent malicious domain accesses; such lists,
however, incur a significant delay in adding new domains as they rely on several manual
sources. Machine learning techniques, on the other hand, require large feature data sets
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and labeled training sets [7, 8]. There is a need to develop techniques that can function
with limited or small data sets in characterizing the observed network behavior to detect
anomalies.
We propose an approach to infer the reputation of a domain or a host as being mali-
cious (or benign) using a limited amount of already known information about hosts within
the network, and about the domains that the hosts access. To apply our approach, we first
construct bipartite graphs of hosts and domains from the HTTP-proxy dataset of a huge
enterprise network, and also from a campus DNS recursive resolver dataset. We apply
the belief propagation algorithm for marginal probability estimation, on the bipartite graph
seeded with the small ground truth. We evaluate our approach using K-fold cross validation
and also by verification against multiple external sources and validation parameters. Our
results on the two datasets show that application of our technique gives high detection rate
with low false positive rates and low false discovery rates. Consequently, our approach can
be applied passively at the edge of an autonomous system for real-time detection.
B. Domain Naming System
Figure 1 shows how the naming system works. The DNS hierarchy consists of a tree of
domains or zones. The root node (denoted by “.”) is at the top. The next level has the well
known domain names called top-level domains. For instance, in a domain name such as
www.google.com., “com” is a top-level domain (TLD). Different levels of domain names
are separated by a period. In the DNS hierarchy, subsequent domain labels (such as google)
are the children of the TLD node, and so on.
The local recursive resolver traverses the DNS hierarchy to resolve a domain name
query. For instance, if a user wishes to find the IP address for www.google.com, the client
machine (also known as the stub resolver) will pass this query to the recursive name server
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Fig. 1. How DNS works
configured to provide answers to DNS queries (step 1 in the figure). Assuming that no
information is cached already, the recursive name server contacts the root name server
asking for the address of www.google.com. The root name server refers the query to com
name servers which in turn refers the query to google.com name servers, which reply with
the required answer. Note that the stub resolver issued a recursive DNS query to the local
recursive DNS server, which retrieves the answer from the web iteratively by reaching out
to the necessary name servers on the Internet.
The name servers responsible for answering the all DNS queries belonging to a do-
main, are considered to be authoritative for that domain name. For instance, queries such
as mail.google.com, plus.google.com, etc., are answered with fresh information from the
authoritative name servers such as ns1.google.com. This information may have already
been cached and it is up to the end user to use cached data or authoritative data. The DNS
response indicates whether the reply was sent from an authoritative name server, by setting
an AA bit in the DNS response packet.
The recursive name server outlined above may also act as a DNS aggregator which
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serves a small subnetwork. The stub resolvers within the subnet are configured to issue their
DNS queries to the aggregator. The aggregator on receiving queries, does not iteratively
resolve the queries, as a normal recursive server would. Instead, the aggregator acts like
a stub resolver and forwards the query recursively to another DNS recursive server which
resolves the query, and provides the answer back to the aggregator which then forwards it
to the respective stub resolver.
DNS information propagates in units called DNS Resource Records (RRs). The RRs
may indicate IP address of the host name asked (A record), the host name for an IP ad-
dress (reverse mapping using a PTR record), the name servers for the queried domain
(NS records), and more. Various techniques proposed in the chapters ahead look either
at the domain names of various DNS RRs or look at the corresponding value for the type
of RR. For instance, for type A records, we look at the IP address, for PTR record, we
use the corresponding domain name again. It is important to note the terminology we
use in the chapters ahead. For a host-name such as abc.examplesite.org, we consider org
as the TLD or a first-level domain, examplesite as the second-level domain label, exam-
plesite.org as second-level domain. Similarly, abc denotes third-level domain label and
abc.examplesite.org is the third-level domain and a sub-domain of examplesite.org.
In context of various DNS based attacks, cache poisoning attempts to pollute the huge
cache of DNS recursive resolvers which serve stub resolvers within the autonomous sys-
tem. Poisoning of DNS records results in modification of the RRs such that the informa-
tion a RR represents is rogue. For instance, attackers can poison DNS type A record for
www.citibank.com where the true IP address of the web server is now replaced by the IP
address of a rogue server with a website resembling the original website. As a result, when
a stub resolver queries for the affected domain, the user will be tricked into accessing the
rogue website with possibly losing their confidential information to attackers. Our work fo-
cuses on identifying poisoned NS records and also DNS packets transmitted to rogue DNS
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servers rather than the local recursive server. In addition, we focus on characteristics of the
domain name queried by the stub resolver for detecting botnets or malicious domain/URL
access.
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CHAPTER II
MIND: MISDIRECTED DNS PACKET DETECTOR
A. Introduction
Domain Naming System (DNS) forms one of the most critical network infrastructure com-
ponents in the Internet. Recently it has become increasingly vulnerable to exploits and
attacks. Various types of attacks have been launched on or using the local DNS recursive
resolvers of victim networks as well as authoritative name servers of various domains [9].
These include reflection attacks, amplification attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS), cache poisoning, indirection and many more. Cache poisoning
and indirection attacks, in particular, have seen a surge in the recent past. These attacks
expose users to malicious entities eager to mine confidential user information. In this chap-
ter, we present a detection and prevention mechanism for attacks based on indirection and
poisoned NS records.
DNS cache poisoning refers to the replacement of valid answer/authority/additional
resource records (RRs) with malformed content. Cache poisoning attack requires the at-
tacker to guess the 16-bit TXID, the transaction ID used to identify a DNS packet and match
the response to the query issued by a recursive server. Guessing the correct ID makes the
recursive resolver accept a corrupted packet, thereby serving malicious information to its
clients. However, randomization of DNS and IP layer features of the network packet makes
poisoning somewhat difficult.
Indirection attack, however, refers to a stealthy change in the DNS resolver address on
a stub resolver. The change in the DNS resolver address directs all recursive DNS queries
to a malicious resolver. The malicious resolver then provides the victim with false domain
information, subsequently leading to the victim’s confidential data being compromised.
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Indirection can be achieved by malware installation, as done by the notorious DNSChanger
worm [10].
Many solutions are proposed to counter DNS cache poisoning and indirection. How-
ever, most have not been widely adopted. For instance, DNSSEC [11–13] provides authen-
ticity of DNS data using cryptographic techniques. However, it still awaits deployment ow-
ing to requirements of large infrastructural changes. Similarly, DJBDNS overcomes many
of BIND’s shortcomings but is yet to see a notable deployment. Changes adaptable to ex-
isting systems, however, enjoy ready adoption. For instance, DNS Black Lists(DNSBLs)
have been used to counter email spam. Therefore, it becomes essential that we design
techniques that can co-exist with present systems. Hence, we propose MiND (Misdirected
dNs packet Detector), an easily deployable technique that provides counter-threat measures
without any changes to the existing DNS infrastructure. Our technique provides domain
specific security without requiring cooperation from other network entities.
MiND is used to counter the threat posed by DNS packet indirection arising due to
poisoned NS records present in the recursive resolver cache, or due to malware induced
modifications of system’s resolver settings. We implicitly verify the validity of all types
of DNS records by ensuring the validity of their destination address. Our tool uses a self
accumulated database of name servers, which continuously updates itself. To obtain a DNS
record, the local recursive resolver should be able to resolve such a query by sending itera-
tive queries to root name servers, the Top Level Domain (TLD) name servers and ultimately
the domain’s name servers respectively. If however, we find a DNS query directed towards
IP addresses other than the valid name servers (with respect to the queried domain), the
query is considered as an anomaly. We obtain the valid name server information using
the publicly available authoritative PTR/NS records. To counter the dynamic nature of the
valid set of name servers for a domain, we also consider Time-to-Live(TTL) of DNS name
server records when validating DNS queries. Expired records are updated and hence used
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for query verification. We show that such a simple validation is effective in determining
misdirected DNS packets originating from within the network. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to collect the name server information by executing a light-weight
crawl of the IPv4 address space, and using it for DNS packet validation.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• We propose MiND, a counter-measure to DNS indirection and cache poisoning at-
tacks, that is readily deployable.
• We demonstrate the quick building of a name server database, which helps us asso-
ciate a given domain name to a specific set of domain authoritative name servers.
• Demonstrate that MiND indeed makes it difficult for the attacker to compromise
various recursive DNS resolvers as well as stub resolvers (ordinary hosts).
With a low false positive rate and moderate hardware and software requirements, we
show that MiND can be used to effectively protect a network from DNS based attacks.
B. Related Work
In this section, we review prior solutions proposed to counter DNS cache poisoning and
indirection. We also review known attack techniques and briefly cover the literature that
has helped build our system.
Dagon et al. [9] describe and define the problem of DNS cache poisoning and indi-
rection. The authors in [14] use 0x20-bit encoding scheme to encode the question sec-
tion within the DNS packet and hence counter DNS cache poisoning. The 0x20 encoding
scheme changes cases of letters in a domain name based on the key unique to the resolver.
The resolution software is expected to reply with the same cased letters as originally re-
quested, increasing the difficulty for the attacker as she has to guess more entities (case
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letters, TXID) with respect to the packet, within the round trip time of a DNS reply. WSEC-
DNS [15] utilizes the wild card capability of CNAME records to increase cache poisoning
difficulty significantly. Yuan et al. [16] propose using a peer-to-peer system to counter
DNS cache poisoning. Our work makes cache poisoning of NS records highly difficult,
with reduced latency. Additionally, we are able to handle DNS packet indirection arising
from stub resolvers within our network.
Delays between various hosts and DNS servers are measured in [17]. These delay
measurements help in outlining timeout requirements of various dependent applications.
These results guide our work as explained later in this chapter. DNS TXID and port
randomization [18] are two of the most prevalent techniques for preventing cache poi-
soning. However, with the advent of Kaminsky attack, the said measures have become
obsolete [19].
The Kaminsky attack coaxes the stub resolver to query for sub-domains of the victim
domain name. To achieve poisoning, the attacker attempts to guess the randomized packet
parameters. The stub resolver is forced to query other sub-domains of the victim domain
without waiting for TTL expiry. In most cases, Kaminsky attack has been shown to poison
DNS resolver caches in a matter of seconds. Our method is independent of the technique
used to poison, and hence can immediately detect and isolate suspicious poisoned records.
The employment of a secondary cache of expired DNS records is proposed to miti-
gate the effects of DoS attacks on DNS infrastructure [20]. Our approach also employs a
secondary cache or a database for DNS records, but our approach is focused on detecting
anomalous DNS resolutions in real-time and the information cached by our tool is only a
subset of that proposed in [20].
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Fig. 2. DNS cache poisoning scenario.
C. Threat Model
Cache poisoning attacks can be initiated from outside or from within an autonomous sys-
tem. Figure 2 shows cache poisoning attempts where the attacker tries to guess the correct
TXID (16-bit transaction ID) of the DNS packet. It is assumed that the DNS traffic is
invisible to entities outside the autonomous system, and hence it is impossible to observe
the domain query packets. If assumed otherwise, poisoning DNS resolver cache becomes
trivial, as the correct TXID can now be placed in the spoofed reply. Mechanisms such
as [14, 15] make it much more difficult to spoof a reply to a DNS query.
Attackers who do not possess control over entities within a network, utilize hit-and-
trial methods to meet their objectives. For instance, the attackers can spoof replies for most
commonly accessed domain names (such as www.google.com) when attempting to poison
a resolver. The chances that their spoofed packets get accepted increase, depending on the
popularity of such domain names.
Another form of attack can be initiated from within the local network (or autonomous
system) using ordinary stub resolvers. A stub resolver forced to query for particular host
names can reduce the time required to poison resolver’s cache. These client machines can
stage a Kaminsky style attack by coordinating with external hosts.
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Our threat model considers both the insider and outsider threats as described above.
D. The MiND System
In this section, we describe MiND, the tool used for detecting DNS indirection of all types
of DNS records, and cache poisoning of NS records, within a local autonomous system.
Our approach employs a database of authoritative name servers for all domain names. In
sub-section 3, we explain how the name server database is created and maintained. The
destination name server in the DNS query is validated against the set of authentic name
servers stored in the database, and an anomaly alert is raised if there is no match. The
name server check against the database is done in parallel to the query resolution and thus
the results in the response packet can be questioned if it is resolved by an unknown name
server.
Several domains employ rapidly changing name server identities for load balancing
or other purposes. Such a system uses fast changing NS records, and/or name server’s A
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Fig. 4. MiND flowchart.
records. It is vital that our system recognizes such configurations appropriately and does
not raise false alarms. To decrease the possibility of false alarms, we continuously update
the authoritative name server information. The freshness and validity of the database is
ensured using the TTL parameters present in the NS and A records. The following sub-
sections discuss each component of the MiND system in detail. We also outline the benefits
and potential issues of our technique.
1. Name Server Database Feasibility
Figure 3 represents the CDF of the TTL values for general A records, NS records, and A
records of name servers respectively. From the graph, we observe that the TTL values of NS
records are typically higher than the A records. While 90% of A records have TTL values
less than 10000 sec, the same TTL value holds true only for about 45% of NS records. It
is noteworthy that A records of the name servers also exhibit large TTL values, with 55%
of A records of name servers having TTLs smaller than 10000 seconds. This suggests that
maintaining the name server database is more convenient as the name server information is
stable over a longer period of time. Alternatively, it allows us to use the same database for
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Fig. 5. MiND query verifying data structure.
DNS query verification over longer intervals, making our approach scalable.
2. MiND Query Verification
The MiND anomaly alert system sits at the edge of the administrative domain observ-
ing all DNS packets. Our primary objective is to determine anomalies present within an
autonomous system. Therefore, we present our analysis for outgoing DNS packets. As
described later, incoming packets may also be validated using our tool.
The packet validation algorithm is presented in Figure 4. As the flowchart demon-
strates, a packet is first checked for being a DNS indirection instance. Commonly, a stub
resolver directs recursive DNS requests to local name servers only. However, if we en-
counter packets whose source IP address is different from the local recursive name servers,
it is flagged as an indirection instance. On the other hand, independently installed resolvers
within the local network can make iterative DNS requests to name servers outside too. With
MiND in place, such resolvers need to be white-listed and this helps the network admin-
istrators to be aware of other resolvers in the network. Also, known free recursive DNS
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services like GoogleDNS [21] are white-listed.
Following the check for DNS indirection, we validate the query packet for being mis-
directed due to a poisoned resolver cache. If the cache of the local recursive DNS resolver
contains corrupted NS records, then DNS packets are routed to name servers different from
authoritative name servers for the queried domain. Using the name server database, we
build a data structure in memory which quickly identifies the authoritative name servers for
a given domain name. As shown in Figure 5, the data structure is organized into different
tiers, with each tier containing name server information relevant to the corresponding sub-
domain. For query verification, using the name server information for up to the third-level
domains, improves the results considerably. We justify the rationale of using such a design
in the results section.
To verify DNS query packets, we also use TTL values associated with the name
servers, obtained while collecting the database. There are two types of TTLs associated
with a name server. One type specifies the TTL value of name servers for a particular do-
main. The second type specifies the TTL of the IP address associated with the name server.
To ensure correctness of our analysis, we consider the minimum of the two TTL values.
The use of TTL is motivated by the fact that many networks change their configuration
rapidly, which includes altering service and/or name server IP addresses. For example,
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai and LimeLight Networks exhibit such
behavior. Therefore, the name server database might not always be able to determine the
exact network state. However, by considering TTLs, we are able to determine the currently
valid set of authoritative records, which if found expired, may be fetched again.
We check an outgoing DNS query against the name server information of multiple sub-
domains corresponding to the query. If the outgoing address matches the valid name server
information obtained from any level of the query verifying data structure, we consider the
query as directed to a safe name server. Else, it is considered misdirected.
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Fast changing name servers pose problems during packet verification. We could
falsely designate a packet as misdirected because the query does not seem to be bound for
the most recent set of name servers publicized by the domain, although the name servers
belong to the authoritative AS. This may happen because of caching of NS records with
TTL values modified at the clients or any of the intermediate resolvers. In such a scenario,
we use an additional expired cache of name servers. Such a cache is stored in the same way
as the list of current (and valid) name servers associated with a domain name. However,
the expired cache consists of authoritative name servers seen previously for the domain,
and thus, we may see DNS packets destined for such name servers. We associate a learning
time for such an expired cache, allowing us to supplement the valid set of name servers ap-
propriately during packet verification. Each name server in the expired set still represents
a trusted entity. We note that the use of expired records makes MiND vulnerable, only in
the event where any of the expired name server IP address’ authority is transferred to (or
bought by) a rogue identity. However, such an event would take a considerable time to
happen. To prevent such abuse, we frequently flush the expired name server set. Section E
highlights the benefits obtained by using such an expired cache.
If a packet matches any of the validation criteria as outlined in Figure 4, it is deemed
harmless. However, on failing every test mentioned above, we flag such a packet as anoma-
lous. The network administrator may thus choose to take appropriate action in the form of
either patching necessary machines, correcting mis-configuration at source hosts, blacklist-
ing domains and/or hosts, etc.
In addition to detecting the compromised machines (as determined above), MiND may
be used to prevent cache poisoning of NS records too. Prevention is achievable through an
analysis of all incoming DNS packets’ NS records present in either answer, authoritative, or
the additional sections of the records. The MiND system thus provides counter-mechanism
for Kaminsky attacks [22]. With MiND in place, malformed name server address(es) as
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advertised in a rogue DNS response packet, can be immediately identified and the attack
thwarted. In addition, on observing multiple DNS replies for a query within a short window
of time, our tool may be configured to raise a poisoning attempt alert.
3. Collecting the Name Server Database
The name server database is simply a collection of name servers corresponding to different
domains present in a host name. The name server database consists only of NS records
(with A records obtained only for the name servers) relevant to domains crawled. We
use the publicly available PTR records corresponding to IPv4 addresses and thereby de-
termine the list of valid name servers. We argue that PTR record specification determines
the authoritative host name corresponding to an IP address. The name servers obtained by
querying for multiple domain levels present in a PTR record listed host name, correspond
to an authoritative set. It is important to note that PTR record pollution requires hijacking
the name server for the victim domain’s address space. For attackers, the benefits obtained
from such an attack are very limited and thus their focus instead is to pollute the recursive
resolver serving an autonomous system.
The name server database also stores TTL value associated with every name server/IP
address combination. Such a collection of records is only a small subset of what a regular
resolver is expected to store in its cache. The small set that we use can be quickly read into
the main memory and has a small memory footprint. This sub-section discusses how we
build this database within a small period of time.
PTR records contain IP address to host name mapping. Therefore, building an ex-
haustive name server database, at first, requires sending out a DNS PTR query for every IP
address in the IPv4 (32-bit) space and hence obtaining the host name for that IP address.
The name servers are then obtained by sending out an NS query (and if not cached already,
an A query to determine the name server’s IP address). The results are logged into the
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database. We query the name server records for second and third-level sub-domains of the
host name returned as a response to a PTR request. To elaborate, if the PTR record cor-
responding to an arbitrary IP address gives random.abc.examplesite.org as the answer, we
determine the name servers for abc.examplesite.org as well as examplesite.org. For PTR
responses which contain multiple host names for an IP address (in the form of CNAME or
more PTR records), we process each returned answer individually.
Determining the host name and the name servers for the corresponding domains re-
quires sending out at least two queries for every address in the IPv4 space which may thus
require sending a large number of queries cumulatively. However, we apply numerous
heuristics to drastically reduce the required resources. We note that a considerable part of
the Internet address space is unallocated/reserved which reduces the number of queries that
need to be sent [23]. We also avoid generating name server queries for domains already
seen, thus saving a large bandwidth and reducing latency of database collection.
To further reduce the volume of queries generated for aggregating a name server
database, we analyze flags in DNS packets obtained in response to PTR requests for class
A, B, C network prefixes. Thus, crawling large networks may altogether be avoided if the
response packet indicates so. Note that we crawl the IP address space randomly to avoid
appearing as a malicious scanning host.
random.abc.examplesite.org
ns1.examplesite.org:128.166.254.2:300ns1.examplesite.org:128.166.254.4:300
ns3.abc.examplesite.org:128:166.254.7:1600
...
Fig. 6. Sample line from a name server database file.
Figure 6 shows a sample line from one of our name server database files. The first line
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corresponds to the host name of an IP address, returned as a reply for the PTR request. The
following line denotes the name servers authoritative for examplesite.org. Name server in-
formation for abc.examplesite.org is present immediately below. Note that we also log each
name server’s IPv4 address and TTL associated with the name server. We also enable accu-
mulating name servers with multiple IP addresses. Apart from host names corresponding
to the 32-bit IPv4 space, the MiND query verifier requires information about name servers
corresponding to the top level domains (TLDs). We use the list provided by [24, 25] to
compile all TLDs and hence determine the name servers for each TLD.
The MiND system can also be deployed without complete authoritative name server
information. However, the latency of query verification will be higher in such a scenario
as the corresponding authoritative name server information will now have to be retrieved
explicitly. Instead, once a database is built, only a small fraction of it needs to be updated
frequently thereafter.
a. Database Authenticity and Completeness
With reference to utilizing a personal DNS resolver for database collection, a natural ques-
tion arises as to why can’t our own recursive resolver be poisoned? The database collection
resolver, unlike a recursive resolver serving network clients, is configured to refuse any
recursive queries from unknown hosts. All queries are made on the loopback interface.
The database may be updated only when we receive the same answer from two resolvers
located outside our domain/AS. Compromising two resolvers makes it harder for the at-
tacker to poison their caches. Utilizing external resolvers, however, increases the latency.
Therefore, deploying such a system for online query verification may delay applications
requiring quick responses. DoX [16] utilizes such a configuration. However, fetching a
small number of NS records, as we do, makes the solution viable.
The latency cost of our verification is significantly reduced by the employment of
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a name server database (as highlighted in section E). We focus on verifying all records
by caching NS records only. In a simple scenario for DoX, which has a minimum of
two peers, every query requires a query resolution from both of the peers. With MiND
however, an additional query is issued to populate the name server database only if the
required information is not present. MiND is also view independent, unlike DoX. This
implies that inconsistencies arising with peers in DoX due to geographic separation, does
not affect MiND as the database is collected within the autonomous system to be protected.
Another security enhancement measure is by executing a TCP based database collec-
tion. Using the TCP protocol ensures that the packet cannot be spoofed and that the DNS
record is authentic, unless poisoned prior to collection.
As a consequence of all such measures, the database resolver becomes less prone to
cache poisoning attacks and the integrity and authenticity of the database can be main-
tained.
We note that although an optional part of DNS configuration, PTR record specification
by domain administrators can improve the quality of our database. We also note that with
the absence of name server information in our database, we fetch the required name servers
complementing the verification procedure. For instance, many web domains may be hosted
by an IP address. However, only one PTR record pointing to one of the hostnames, may be
present. In such a case, for all unseen domains, we find the name servers with a new DNS
lookup.
4. Security Implications
MiND has been developed with the goal of providing an additional layer of security over
the existing mechanisms. In a normal scenario, DNS resolver poisoning may be achieved
by focusing attack resources only on the recursive resolver. With MiND deployed, attackers
must now additionally compromise the name server database to achieve success.
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With our tool, we focus on preventing corruption of NS records. However, by verify-
ing the destination address of every type of DNS record, we implicitly ensure each record’s
correctness. We note that incoming DNS replies may also be spoofed and thus the DNS
records may serve malicious data. With MiND, we also deploy a DNS response anomaly
detector which looks for a burst of incoming responses within a short time. Thus, attackers
need to be successful in matching TXID and random port number with the first packet, as
subsequent packets will result in a response anomaly alert.
E. Results
1. System Requirements
The name server database collection engine is a multi-threaded application written using
C and C++, and the commonly available resolver (libresolv) and packet capture libraries
[26–28]. We use an Intel Core 2 Duo (@2.33GHz)Linux box running kernel 2.6.31, with
2GB RAM and plenty of hard drive space. The actual name server persistent database size
is less than 1GB. The box uses a BIND9 DNS resolver and our application makes all DNS
requests to this box. The private DNS resolver is configured against misuse and accepts
recursive queries from trusted hosts only. The query checker is also developed in C and
C++ too. The MiND query verifier system uses the same hardware configuration as the
name server database collection engine.
DNS query verification uses the campus DNS trace (UDP port 53 traffic) for analysis.
We use a fresh database for every analysis. We also use several campus traces from De-
cember 2009, for offline analysis. The subsections below highlight whether the results are
based on online or offline DNS traffic.
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Table I. MiND performance
Exp. Approx. hours Total outgoing Anomalies after
# of training packets analyzed forward checks (%)
1 2 111306 921 (0.83)
2 5 173962 1342 (0.77)
3 8 286114 2704 (0.94)
4 15 288441 2423 (0.84)
5 30 1152469 8793 (0.76)
2. Performance Analysis
Table I shows the results from the analysis of live DNS traces. Each experiment is per-
formed for a different duration of time (or the total number of packets). For each experi-
ment, we consider both outgoing and incoming DNS packets (which use the UDP protocol)
flowing between our recursive resolver and name servers outside our autonomous system.
However, we validate only the outgoing packets.
The second column in table I represents the time for which our tool is trained before it
starts packet verification. By training, we imply that the expired name servers for observed
domains were not discarded. Rather, they were moved to a separate cache and thus used
in conjunction with the current set of name servers for validating outgoing DNS packets.
Column 3 represents the total outgoing packets which were verified with our tool, after the
initial training.
On subjecting the outgoing packets to MiND query verification and forward checks,
we find an average of 0.84% anomalies, as highlighted in column 4. By forward checks,
we imply validating the destination address of the DNS query against the name servers of
sub-domains of the third-level domain name. False positive rate can be further reduced by
checking if the name server and the destination IP address of the DNS packet, belong to
the same AS. This check reduces the false positive rate to an average of 0.046%. However,
such a check increases the scope of an attack as the rogue resolver may belong to the same
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Fig. 7. (a) Latency of verification. (b) Cache hit ratios for a week long dataset.
AS. With time, we expect the fraction of false positives to decrease as more name servers
get aggregated in the expired cache.
We further analyze the packets remaining from above, specifically for experiment 3.
From our analysis we find that 15.38% of the anomalous packets, belong to malicious
domains. The malicious nature of the suspect domains is confirmed with a domain repu-
tation verification service [29]. The bulk of the malicious packets belong to exitguide.ru.
We further confirm the malfeasance of this domain using McAfee’s domain reputation
checker [30] which associates this domain name with highest risk. We also find that an-
other 24.17% of the anomalous packets from experiment 3, belong to the category where
either the NS records could not be retrieved or the A records for corresponding NS records
were absent. Such a case may represent botnet hosted domains which publish name servers
at specific times. In addition to above, we find 38.47% packets for which the name servers
were present, but were seen to be in a different AS than checked before. This commonly
occurs for CDNs or domains with low TTLs, which switch ASes rapidly. The remaining
22.17% of the packets occur due to the CNAME replies observed for NS queries. However,
for forward and AS check, we do not consider CNAME referrals.
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3. Latency of Query Verification
Figure 7(a) shows the cumulative distribution function of latency observed with MiND
deployed under different scenarios. The figure shows the latency for three cases. The top
most plot of latency refers to using MiND when the DNS packets destined for white-listed
domains, are unconditionally verified. The middle plot refers to the latency observed when
no white-listing is considered. For this particular analysis, we consider five frequently used
domains for white-listing, namely akamai.net, gslb.com, weather.com, facebook.com, and
adnxs.com.
The last plot represents latency observed with a simplistic setup for DoX [16]. With
this setup, every outgoing DNS query is validated with another peer. In a more powerful
setup for DoX, multiple resolvers resolve the queries and consult with other peers before
providing clients with an answer. Our setup for DoX should bear minimum latency.
As the plot shows, the difference between latency observed with MiND and DoX is
quite large. We owe this to the fact that many outgoing queries are verified quickly using
our database of records. On the other hand, with DoX, every query needs to be fetched and
then compared with peers for validation. We also observe that consideration of a white-list
of only 5 domain names, results in a slight improvement in latency. We believe that with a
white-list consisting of hundreds of domains, the latency gain would be much higher.
4. Interesting Observations
Here we present the interesting events observed as a consequence of DNS query verifi-
cation. All the instances reported below represent different anomalies that may interest
network administrators.
Absent name servers: From our analysis, we discover several irregularities, owing to
no name servers being found for the domain names present in the query. Rather, such
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queries were resolved by simply following referrals from iterative replies (that is, using
the AUTHORITY section data in DNS responses). Our implementation does not consider
AUTHORITY section data. We observe that blacklisting services like spamcop.net, and
surbl.org fall into this category and attribute for almost 20% of such packets.
Mistyped domain names: During our analysis, we observe several mistyped domain
names. The frequently misspelled DNS domain name packets include MX queries for g-
mail.com, A queries for google.co, MX queries for hotmal.com, hotmai.com, hotmaill.com,
and more. While in all of the cases mentioned above, the mistyped domain names have been
pre-registered by the responsible authorities, we note that the clients within our autonomous
system generating such domain names, may represent irregularities. Such domains show
up in our analysis because of the absence of NS records corresponding to these domains.
With the frequency of these queried domains being of the order of several hundreds within
a short time, MiND helps detect them for examination by system administrators.
Poisoning attacks: Our findings indicate that clients within our autonomous system re-
peatedly query for domains such as i.metarss.com, computerfinance.net and a few others
within a short time. Such an analysis also highlights the local resolver configuration. It
seems that the caching of NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL records is disabled. Therefore, the
client applications keep querying for the same hostname even after previous failures. Net-
work administrators may patch such anomalous clients thereby saving a lot of bandwidth.
Simulated attack: We also simulate a poisoning attack on our private recursive resolver.
The attack is accomplished by staging a Denial of Service attack from one of our host
machines, to our experimental recursive resolver. We use a custom program to generate
DNS packet bursts with random IDs and use iptables to redirect malformed packets, to our
victim resolver. With the detection mechanism in place, we are indeed able to generate
instant alerts.
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5. Highly Dynamic Name Servers
We use each experiment (as in table I) to determine the frequently changing name server
configurations. To determine the fast changing name servers, we simply determine the
frequency of every second-level domain name, for which we fetch the name servers re-
peatedly. The frequent update is forced by the use of small TTL values for the NS or A
records. Based on our analysis, the top five domains for which we update our database re-
peatedly, includes akamai.net, gslb.com, weather.com, facebook.com, and adnxs.com. The
domain names also highlight their popularity within our autonomous system, as these do-
main queries would form a good proportion of all outgoing packets.
The data presented above identifies frequently requested domain names. Using such
domain names helps reduce the latency of query verification. By white-listing IP addresses
of the name servers for known domains, we can quickly verify several queries without
the need for frequent database update. However, such an analysis can also reveal rogue
domains which exhibit domain fast fluxing behavior.
6. Determining False Negatives
To assess the ability of the MiND system to identify indirection anomalies, we use simu-
lated malicious DNS queries. To generate misdirected packets from our network, we infect
five machines with a custom program designed to periodically generate DNS queries for
well-known domain names. For instance, an infected host generates DNS type A requests
with the queried host name as qNum.google.com where qNum is the query number sent
out by the particular stub resolver. The destination name server IP address for each stub
resolver was assigned arbitrarily (e.g. “6.6.6.6”) taking care that the destination IP address
did not belong to the queried domain’s autonomous system. The time period for querying
was set to one minute. The queried domain names assigned to other hosts include face-
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book.com, citibank.com, yahoo.com and boa.com. All queries were recursive in nature.
Using our tool, we log all simulated malicious queries generated by stub resolvers in
our network. We confirm the source of malformed queries by examining the domain query
names and IP addresses assigned to our test hosts.
7. Effect of Resolver Cache
We use the offline traces to determine the cache hit ratio for the campus recursive resolver.
Cache hit ratio refers to the percentage of records, for which the answer could be found
in the local resolver cache and hence immediately returned to the stub resolver. The cache
hit ratio at the recursive resolver outlines the efficiency of the MiND system. A higher
cache hit ratio would imply less burden on the MiND system, and thereby lower latencies
for query validation. We determine the cache hit ratio by observing the number of queries
directed by local stub resolvers towards the recursive resolvers and thus computing the
fraction of DNS requests generated by the recursive resolver, to the name servers outside
our autonomous system. As observed from figure 7(b), the average cache hit ratio is about
80%. This implies that the MiND system, which sits at the campus edge, verifies the direct
correctness of the remaining 20% of the queries.
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CHAPTER III
DETECTING ALGORITHMICALLY GENERATED MALICIOUS DOMAIN NAMES
A. Introduction
Recent botnets such as Conficker, Kraken and Torpig have brought in vogue a new method
for botnet operators to control their bots: DNS “domain fluxing”. In this method, each bot
algorithmically generates a large set of domain names and queries each of them until one
of them is resolved and then the bot contacts the corresponding IP-address obtained that
is typically used to host the command-and-control (C&C) server. Besides for command-
and-control, spammers also routinely generate random domain names in order to avoid
detection. For instance, spammers advertise randomly generated domain names in their
spam emails to avoid detection by regular expression based domain blacklists that maintain
signatures for recently ‘spamvertised’ domain names.
The botnets that have used random domain name generation vary widely in the random
word generation algorithm as well as the way it is seeded. For instance, Conficker-A [31]
bots generate 250 domains every three hours while using the current date and time at UTC
(in seconds) as the seed, which in turn is obtained by sending empty HTTP GET queries to
a few legitimate sites such as google.com, baidu.com, answers.com etc. This way, all bots
would generate the same domain names every day. In order to make it harder for a security
vendor to pre-register the domain names, the next version, Conficker-C [32] increased the
number of randomly generated domain names per bot to 50K. Torpig [6,33] bots employ an
interesting trick where the seed for the random string generator is based on one of the most
popular trending topics in Twitter. Kraken employs a much more sophisticated random
word generator and constructs English-language alike words with properly matched vowels
and consonants. Moreover, the randomly generated word is combined with a suffix chosen
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randomly from a pool of common English nouns, verbs, adjective and adverb suffixes, such
as -able, -dom, -hood, -ment, -ship, or -ly.
From the point of view of botnet owner, the economics work out quite well. They only
have to register one or a few domains out of the several domains that each bot would query
every day. Whereas, security vendors would have to pre-register all the domains that a bot
queries every day, even before the botnet owner registers them. In all the cases above, the
security vendors had to reverse engineer the bot executable to derive the exact algorithm
being used for generating domain names. In some cases, their algorithm would predict
domains successfully until the botnet owner would patch all his bots with a re-purposed
executable with a different domain generation algorithm [6].
We argue that reverse engineering of botnet executables is resource- and time-intensive
and precious time may be lost before the domain generation algorithm is cracked and con-
sequently before such domain name queries generated by bots are detected. In this regards,
we raise the following question: can we detect algorithmically generated domain names
while monitoring DNS traffic even when a reverse engineered domain generation algorithm
may not be available?
Hence, we propose a methodology that analyzes DNS traffic to detect if and when
domain names are being generated algorithmically as a line of first defense. In this regards,
our proposed methodology can point to the presence of bots within a network and the
network administrator can disconnect bots from their C&C server by filtering out DNS
queries to such algorithmically generated domain names.
Our proposed methodology is based on the following observation: current botnets do
not use well formed and pronounceable language words since the likelihood that such a
word is already registered at a domain registrar is very high; which could be self-defeating
as the botnet owner would then not be able to control his bots. In turn this means that such
algorithmically generated domain names can be expected to exhibit characteristics vastly
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different from legitimate domain names. Hence, we develop metrics using techniques from
signal detection theory and statistical learning which can detect algorithmically generated
domain names that may be generated via a myriad of techniques: (i) those generated via
pseudo-random string generation algorithms as well as (ii) dictionary-based generators, for
instance the one used by Kraken [34, 35] as well as a publicly available tool, Kwyjibo [36]
which can generate words that are pronounceable yet not in the english dictionary.
Our method of detection comprises of two parts. First, we propose several ways to
group together DNS queries: (i) either by the Top Level Domain (TLD) they all corre-
spond to or; (ii) the IP-address that they are mapped to or; (iii) the connected component
that they belong to, as determined via connected component analysis of the IP-domain
bipartite graph. Second, for each such group, we compute metrics that characterize the dis-
tribution of the alphanumeric characters or bigrams (two consecutive alphanumeric char-
acters) within the set of domain names. Specifically, we propose the following metrics to
quickly differentiate a set of legitimate domain names from malicious ones: (i) Informa-
tion entropy of the distribution of alphanumerics (unigrams and bigrams) within a group
of domains; (ii) Jaccard index to compare the set of bigrams between a malicious domain
name with good domains and; (iii) Edit-distance which measures the number of character
changes needed to convert one domain name to another.
We apply our methodology to a variety of data sets. First, we obtain a set of legitimate
domain names via reverse DNS crawl of the entire IPv4 address space. Next, we obtain
a set of malicious domain names as generated by Conficker, Kraken and Torpig as well
as model a much more sophisticated domain name generation algorithm: Kwyjibo [36].
Finally, we apply our methodology to one day of network traffic from one of the largest
Tier-1 ISPs in Asia and South America and show how we can detect Conficker as well as a
botnet hitherto unknown, which we call Mjuyh (details in Section E).
Our extensive experiments allow us to characterize the effectiveness of each metric in
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detecting algorithmically generated domain names in different attack scenarios. We model
different attack intensities as number of domain names that an algorithm generates. For
instance, in the extreme scenario that a botnet generates 50 domains mapped to the same
TLD, we show that K-L divergence over unigrams achieves 100% detection accuracy albeit
at 15% false positive rate (legitimate domain groups classified as algorithmic). We show
how our detection improves significantly with much lower false positives as the number
of words generated per TLD increases, e.g., when 200 domains are generated per TLD,
then Edit distance achieves 100% detection accuracy with 8% false positives and when
500 domains are generated per TLD, Jaccard Index achieves 100% detection with 0% false
positives.
Finally, our methodology of grouping together domains via connected components
allows us to detect not only “domain fluxing” but also if it was used in combination with
“IP fluxing”. Moreover, computing the metrics over components yields better and faster
detection than other grouping methods. Intuitively, even if botnets were to generate random
words and combine them with multiple TLDs in order to spread the domain names thus
generated (potentially to evade detection), as long as they map these domains such that at
least one IP-address is shared in common, then they reveal a group structure that can be
exploited by our methodology for quick detection. We show that per-component analysis
detects 26.32% more IP addresses than using per-IP analysis and 16.13% more hostnames
than using per-domain analysis when we applied our methodology to detect Conficker in a
Tier-1 ISP trace.
B. Related Work
Characteristics, such as IP addresses, whois records and lexical features of phishing and
non-phishing URLs have been analyzed by McGrath and Gupta [37]. They observed that
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the different URLs exhibited different alphabet distributions. Our work builds on this ear-
lier work and develops techniques for identifying domains employing algorithmically gen-
erated names, potentially for “domain fluxing”. Ma, et al [38], employ statistical learning
techniques based on lexical features (length of domain names, host names, number of dots
in the URL etc.) and other features of URLs to automatically determine if a URL is mali-
cious, i.e., used for phishing or advertising spam. While they classify each URL indepen-
dently, our work is focused on classifying a group of URLs as algorithmically generated
or not, solely by making use of the set of alphanumeric characters used. In addition, we
experimentally compare against their lexical features in Section E and show that our al-
phanumeric distribution based features can detect algorithmically generated domain names
with lower false positives than lexical features. Overall, we consider our work as compli-
mentary and synergistic to the approach in [38].
With reference to the practice of “IP fast fluxing”, e.g., where the botnet owner con-
stantly keeps changing the IP-addresses mapped to a C&C server, [39] implements a detec-
tion mechanism based on passive DNS traffic analysis. In our work, we present a method-
ology to detect cases where botnet owners may use a combination of both domain fluxing
with IP fluxing, by having bots query a series of domain names and at the same time map a
few of those domain names to an evolving set of IP-addresses. Also earlier papers [40, 41]
have analyzed the inner-working of IP fast flux networks for hiding spam and scam infras-
tructure. With regards to botnet detection, [2, 3] perform correlation of network activity in
time and space at campus network edges, and Xie et al in [42] focus on detecting spamming
botnets by developing regular expression based signatures from a dataset of spam URLs .
We find that graph analysis of IP addresses and domain names embedded in DNS
queries and replies reveal interesting macro relationships between different entities and en-
able identification of bot networks (Conficker) that seemed to span many domains and
TLDs. With reference to graph based analysis, [43] utilizes rapid changes in user-bot
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graphs structure to detect botnet accounts.
Statistical and learning techniques have been employed by various studies for predic-
tion [44–46]. We employed results from detection theory in designing our strategies for
classification [47, 48].
Several studies have looked at understanding and reverse-engineering the inner work-
ings of botnets [6,34,35,49–51]. Botlab has carried out an extensive analysis of several bot
networks through active participation [52] and provided us with many example datasets for
malicious domains.
C. Detection Metrics
In this section, we present our detection methodology that is based on computing the distri-
bution of alphanumeric characters for groups of domains. First, we motivate our metrics by
showing how algorithmically generated domain names differ from legitimate ones in terms
of distribution of alphanumeric characters. Next, we present our three metrics, namely
Kullback-Leibler (K-L) distance, Jaccard Index (JI) measure and Edit distance. Finally, in
Section D we present the methodology to group domain names.
1. Data Sets
We first describe the data sets and how we obtained them: (i) Non-malicious ISP Dataset:
We use network traffic trace collected from across 100+ router links at a Tier-1 ISP in Asia.
The trace is one day long and provides details of DNS requests and corresponding replies.
There are about 270,000 DNS name server replies. (ii) Non-malicious DNS Dataset: We
performed a reverse DNS crawl of the entire IPv4 address space to obtain a list of domain
names and their corresponding IP-addresses. We further divided this data set in to several
parts, each comprising of domains which had 500, 200, 100 and 50 domain labels. The
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DNS Dataset is considered as non-malicious for the following reasons. Botnets may own
only a limited number of IP addresses. Based on our study, we find that a DNS PTR request
maps an IP address to only one domain name. The dataset thus obtained will contain very
few malicious domain names per analyzed group. In the event that the bots exhibit IP flux-
ing, it is noteworthy that the botnet owners cannot change the PTR DNS mapping for IP
addresses not owned. Although, the malicious name servers may point to any IP address.
(iii) Malicious datasets: We obtained the list of domain names that were known to have
been generated by recent Botnets: Conficker [31, 32], Torpig [6] and Kraken [34, 35]. As
described earlier in the Introduction, Kraken exhibits the most sophisticated domain gener-
ator by carefully matching the frequency of occurrence of vowels and consonants as well as
concatenating the resulting word with common suffixes in the end such as -able, -dom, etc.
(iv) Kwyjibo: We model a much more sophisticated algorithmic domain name generation
algorithm by using a publicly available tool, Kwyjibo [36] which generates domain names
that are pronounceable yet not in the English language dictionary and hence much more
likely to be available for registration at a domain registrar. The algorithm uses a syllable
generator, where they first learn the frequency of one syllable following another in words
in English dictionary and then automatically generate pronounceable words by modeling it
as a Markov process.
2. Motivation
Our detection methodology is based on the observation that algorithmically generated do-
mains differ significantly from legitimate (human) generated ones in terms of the distribu-
tion of alphanumeric characters. Figure 8 shows the distribution of alphanumeric charac-
ters, defined as the set of English alphabets (a-z) and digits (0-9) for both legitimate as well
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Fig. 8. Probability distributions of malicious and non-malicious domains
as malicious domains 1. We derive the following points: (i) First, note that both the non-
malicious data sets exhibit a non-uniform frequency distribution, e.g., letters ‘m’ and ‘o’
appear most frequently in the non-malicious ISP data set whereas the letter ‘s’ appears most
frequently in the non-malicious DNS data set. (ii) Even the most sophisticated algorith-
mic domain generator seen in the wild for Kraken botnet has a fairly uniform distribution,
albeit with higher frequencies at the vowels: ‘a’, ‘e’ and ‘i’. (iii) If botnets of future were
to evolve and construct words that are pronounceable yet not in the dictionary, then they
would not exhibit a uniform distribution as expected. For instance, Kwyjibo exhibits higher
frequencies at alphabets, ‘e’, ‘g’, ‘i’, ‘l’, ‘n’, etc. In this regards, techniques that are based
on only the distribution of unigrams (single alphanumeric characters) may not be sufficient,
as we will show through the rest of this section.
1Even though domain names may contain characters such as ‘-’, we currently limit our
study to alphanumeric characters only.
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3. Metrics for Anomaly Detection
The K-L(Kullback-Leibler) divergence metric is a non-symmetric measure of ”distance“
between two probability distributions. The divergence (or distance) between two dis-
cretized distributions P and Q is given by: DKL(P ||Q) =
∑n
i=1 P (i)log
P (i)
Q(i)
,
where n is the number of possible values for a discrete random variable. The probabil-
ity distribution P represents the test distribution and the distribution Q represents the base
distribution from which the metric is computed.
Since the K-L measure is asymmetric, we use a symmetric form of the metric, which
helps us deal with the possibility of singular probabilities in either distribution. The modi-
fied K-L metric is computed using the formula: Dsym(PQ) = 12(DKL(P ||Q)+DKL(Q||P )).
Given a test distribution q computed for the domain to be tested, and non-malicious
and malicious probability distribution over the alphanumerics as g and b respectively, we
characterize the distribution as malicious or not via the following optimal classifier (for
proof see section H):
Dsym(qb)−Dsym(qg)
g
≷
b
0 (3.1)
For the test distribution q to be classified as non-malicious, we expect Dsym(qg) to be less
thanDsym(qb). However, ifDsym(qg) is greater thanDsym(qb), the distribution is classified
as malicious.
a. Measuring K-L Divergence with Unigrams
The first metric we design measures the K-L divergence of unigrams by considering all
domain names that belong to the same group, e.g. all domains that map to the same IP-
address or those that belong to the same top-level domain. We postpone discussion of
groups to Section D. Given a group of domains for which we want to establish whether they
were generated algorithmically or not, we first compute the distribution of alphanumeric
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characters to obtain the test distribution. Next, we compute the K-L divergence with a good
distribution obtained from the non-malicious data sets (ISP or DNS crawl) and a malicious
distribution obtained by modeling a botnet that generates alphanumerics uniformly. As
expected, a simple unigram based technique may not suffice, especially to detect Kraken
or Kwyjibo generated domains. Hence, we consider bigrams in our next metric.
b. Measuring K-L Divergence with Bigrams
A simple obfuscation technique that can be employed by algorithmically generated mali-
cious domain names could be to generate domain names by using the same distribution of
alphanumerics as commonly seen for legitimate domains. Hence, in our next metric, we
consider distribution of bigrams, i.e., two consecutive characters. Using such an additional
measure in collaboration with the previously proposed metric, limits the flexibility for the
attacker to compose domain names.
Analogous to the case above, given a group of domains, we extract the set of bigrams
present in it to form a bigram distribution. Note that for the set of alphanumeric char-
acters that we consider [a-z, 0-9], the total number of bigrams possible are 36×36, i.e.,
1,296. Our improved hypothesis now involves validating a given test bigram distribution
against the bigram distribution of non-malicious and malicious domain labels. We use the
database of non-malicious words to determine a non-malicious probability distribution. For
a sample malicious distribution, we generate bigrams randomly. Here as well, we use K-L
divergence over the bigram distribution to determine if a test distribution is malicious or
legitimate.
c. Using Jaccard Index between Bigrams
We present the second metric to measure the similarity between a known set of components
and a test distribution, namely the Jaccard index measure. The metric is defined as
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JI = A∩B
A∪B
where, A and B each represent the set of random variables. For our particular case, the
set comprises of bigrams that compose a domain label or a hostname. Note that Jaccard
index (JI) measure based on bigrams is a commonly used technique for web search engine
spell-checking [53].
The core motivation behind using the JI measure is same as that for K-L divergence.
We expect that bigrams occurring in randomized (or malicious) hostnames to be mostly
different when compared with the set of non-malicious bigrams. To elaborate, we con-
struct a database of bigrams which point to lists of non-malicious words, domain labels or
hostnames, as the case may be. Now for each sub-domain present in a test set, we deter-
mine all non-malicious words that contain at least 75% of the bigrams present in the test
word. Such a threshold helps us discard words with less similarity. However, longer test
words may implicitly satisfy this criteria and may yield ambiguous JI value. As observed
in section E, the word sizes for 95% of non-malicious words do not exceed 24 characters,
and hence we divide all test words into units of 24 character strings. Figure 9 presents the
CDF of domain label sizes as observed in our DNS PTR dataset (described in section E).
Calculating the JI measure is best explained with an example. Considering a ran-
domized hostname such as ickoxjsov.botnet.com, we determine the JI value of the domain
label ickoxjsov by first computing all bigrams (eight, in this case). Next, we examine
each bigram’s queue of non-malicious domain labels, and short list words with at least
75% of bigrams, i.e., six of the eight bigrams. Words satisfying this criteria may include
thequickbrownfoxjumpsoverthelazydog (35 bigrams). However, such a word still has a low
JI value owing to the large number of bigrams in it. Therefore, the JI value is thus com-
puted as 6/(8 + 35 - 6) = 0.16. The low value indicates that the randomized test word does
not match too well with the word from the non-malicious bigram database.
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The JI measure is thus computed for the remaining words. The test words might
comprise of a large number of bigrams and therefore do not always ensure a high JI value.
We compute the JI measure using the equation described above and average it for all test
words belonging to a particular group being analyzed. The averaged JI value for a non-
malicious domain is expected to be higher than those for malicious groups.
As observed via our experiments in Section E, the JI measure is better at determining
domain based anomalies. However, it is also computationally expensive as the database
of non-malicious bigrams needs to be maintained in the memory. Also, classifying a non-
malicious hosts will take more CPU cycles as we would obtain and compare a large set of
words consisting of test word’s bigrams. Section G examines the computational complexity
of various metrics that we use.
d. Edit Distance
Note that the two metrics described earlier, rely on definition of a “good” distribution (K-L
divergence) or database (JI measure). Hence, we define a third metric, Edit distance, which
classifies a group of domains as malicious or legitimate by only looking at the domains
within the group, and is hence not reliant on definition of a database or distribution. The
Edit distance between two strings represents an integral value identifying the number of
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transformations required to transform one string to another. It is a symmetric measure
and provides a measure of intra-domain entropy. The type of eligible transformations are
addition, deletion, and modification. For instance, to convert the word cat to dog, the
edit distance is three as it requires all three characters to be replaced. With reference to
determining anomalous domains, we expect that all domain labels (or hostnames) which are
randomized, will, on an average, have higher edit distance value. We use the Levenshtein
edit distance dynamic algorithm for determining anomalies. The algorithm for computing
the Levenshtein edit distance has been shown in Algorithm 1 [53].
Algorithm 1 Dynamic programming algorithm for finding the edit distance
EditDist(s1 ,s2)
1. int m[i,j] = 0
2. for i ← 1 to |s1|
3. do m[i,0] = i
4. for j ← 1 to |s2|
5. do m[0,j] = j
6. for i ← 1 to |s1|
7. do for j ← 1 to |s2|
8. do m[i,j] = min{m[[i-1,j-1] + if(s1[i] = s2[j]) then 0 else 1 fi,
9. m[i-1,j] + 1
10. m[i,j-1] + 1}
11. return m[|s1|,|s2|]
D. Grouping Domain Names
In this section, we present ways by which we group together domain names in order to
compute metrics that were defined in Section C earlier.
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1. Per-domain Analysis
Note that several botnets use several second-level domain names to generate algorithmic
sub-domains. Hence, one way by which we group together domain names is via the second-
level domain name. The intention is that if we begin seeing several algorithmically gener-
ated domain names being queried such that all of them correspond to the same second-level
domain, then this may be reflective of a few favorite domains being exploited. Hence for
all sub-domains, e.g., abc.examplesite.org, def.examplesite.org, etc., that have the same
second-level domain name examplesite.org, we compute all the metrics over the alphanu-
meric characters and bigrams of the corresponding domain labels. Since domain fluxing
involves a botnet generating a large number of domain names, we consider only domains
which contain a sufficient number of third-level domain labels, e.g., 50, 100, 200 and 500
sub-domains.
2. Per-IP Analysis
As a second method of grouping, we consider all domains that are mapped to the same
IP-address. This would be reflective of a scenario where a botnet has registered several of
the algorithmic domain names to the same IP-address of a command-and-control server.
Determining if an IP address is mapped to several such malicious domains is useful as
such an IP-address or its corresponding prefix can be quickly blacklisted in order to sever
the traffic between a command-and-control server and its bots. We use the dataset from a
Tier-1 ISP to determine all IP-addresses which have multiple hostnames mapped to it. For
a large number of hostnames representing one IP address, we explore the above described
metrics, and thus identify whether the IP address is malicious or not.
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3. Component Analysis
A few botnets have taken the idea of domain fluxing further and generate names that span
multiple TLDs, e.g., Conficker-C generates domain names in 110 TLDs. At the same time
domain fluxing can be combined with another technique, namely “IP fluxing” [39] where
each domain name is mapped to an ever changing set of IP-addresses in an attempt to evade
IP blacklists. Indeed, a combination of the two is even harder to detect. Hence, we propose
the third method for grouping domain names into connected components.
We first construct a bipartite graphGwith IP-addresses on one side and domain names
on the other. An edge is constructed between a domain name and an IP-address if that
IP-address was ever returned as one of the responses in a DNS query. When multiple IP
addresses are returned, we draw edges between all the returned IP addresses and the queried
host name.
First, we determine the connected components of the bipartite graph G, where a con-
nected component is defined as one which does not have any edges with any other compo-
nents. Next, we compute the various metrics (K-L divergence for unigrams and bigrams,
JI measure for bigrams, Edit distance) for each component by considering all the domain
names within a component.
Component extraction separates the IP-domain graph into components which can be
classified in to the following classes: (i) IP fan: these have one IP-address which is mapped
to several domain names. Besides the case where one IP-address is mapped to several al-
gorithmic domains, there are several legitimate scenarios possible. First, this class could
include domain hosting services where one IP-address is used to provide hosting to several
domains, e.g. Google Sites, etc. Other examples could be mail relay service where one
mail server is used to provide mail relay for several MX domains. Another example could
be when domain registrars provide domain parking services, i.e., someone can purchase a
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domain name while asking the registrar to host it temporarily. (ii) Domain fan: these con-
sist of one domain name connected to multiple IPs. An IP-fluxing domain would be belong
to this category. This class will contain components belonging to the legitimate content
providers such as Google, Yahoo!, etc. (iii)Many-to-many component: these are compo-
nents that have multiple IP addresses and multiple domain names, e.g., Content Distribution
Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai. Components of this type include the Conficker-C bot-
net group where a domain name maps to multiple IP addresses and the corresponding C&C
server is shared by the fluxing domains.
In section F, we briefly explain the classification algorithm that we use to classify test
components as malicious or not.
E. Results
In this section, we present results of employing various metrics across different groups, as
described in section C and D. We briefly describe the data set used for each experiment.
With all our experiments, we present the results based on the consideration of increas-
ing number of domain labels. In general, we observe that using a larger test data set yields
better results.
1. Per-domain Analysis
a. Data Set
The analysis in this sub-section is based only on the domain labels belonging to a domain.
The non-malicious distribution g may be obtained from various sources. For our analysis,
we use a database of DNS PTR records corresponding to all IPv4 addresses. The database
contains 659 second-level domains with at least 50 third-level sub-domains, while there are
103 second-level domains with at least 500 third-level sub-domains. From the database, we
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Fig. 10. ROC curves for Per-domain analysis (K-L metric’s unigram and bigram evaluation)
extract all second-level domains which have at least 50 third-level sub-domains. All third-
level domain labels corresponding to such domains are used to generate the distribution
g. For instance, a second-level domain such as university.edu may have many third-level
domain labels such as physics, cse, humanities etc. We use all such labels that belong to
trusted domains, for determining g.
To generate a malicious base distribution b, we randomly generate as many characters
as present in the non-malicious distribution. We use domain labels belonging to well-
known malware based domains identified by Botlab, and also a publicly available webspam
database, as malicious domains [54, 55] for verification using our metrics. Botlab provides
us with various domains used by Kraken, Pushdo, Storm, MegaD, and Srizbi [54]. For
per-domain analysis, the test words used are the third-level domain labels.
Figure 8 shows how malicious/non-malicious distributions appear for the DNS PTR
dataset as well as the ISP dataset described in the following sections.
We will present the results for all the four measures described earlier, for domain-
based analysis. In later sections, we will only present data from one of the measures for
brevity.
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Fig. 11. ROC curves for Per-domain analysis (Jaccard Index and Edit Distance evaluation)
b. K-L Divergence with Unigram Distribution
We measure the symmetric K-L distance metric from the test domain to the malicious/non-
malicious alphabet distributions. We classify the test domain as malicious or non-malicious
based on equation (10) in section H. Figure 10(a) shows the results from our experiment
presented as an ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve which evaluates detection
rates against the false positive rates.
The figure shows that the different sizes of test data sets produce relatively different
results. The area under the ROC is a measure of the goodness of the metric. We observe
that with 200 or 500 domain labels, we cover a relatively greater area, implying that using
many domain labels helps obtain accurate results. For example, using 500 labels, we obtain
100% detection rate with only 2.5% false positive rate. Note that with a larger data set, we
indeed expect higher true positive rates for small false positive rates, as larger samples will
stabilize the evaluated metrics.
The number of domain labels required for accurate detection corresponds to the la-
tency of accurately classifying a previously unseen domain. The results suggest that a
48
domain-fluxing domain can be accurately characterized by the time it generates around
500 names.
c. K-L Divergence with Bigram Distribution
Figure 10(b) presents the results of employing K-L distance metric over bigram distribu-
tions. We observe again that using 200 or 500 domain labels does better than using smaller
number of labels, with 500 labels doing the best. Experiments with 50/100 domain labels
yield similar results.
We note that the performance with unigram distributions is slightly better than using
bigram distributions. However, when botnets employ counter measures to our techniques,
the bigram distributions may provide better defense compared to unigram distributions as
they require more effort to match the good distribution (g).
d. Jaccard Measure of Bigrams
The Jaccard Index measure does significantly better in comparison to the previous metrics.
From figure 11(a), it is evident that using 500 domain labels gives us a clear separation
for classification of test domains (and hence an area of 1). Using 50 or 100 labels is fairly
equivalent with 200 labels doing comparatively better. The JI measure produces higher
false positives for smaller number of domains (50/100/200) than K-L distance measures.
e. Edit Distance of Domain Labels
Figure 11(b) shows the performance using edit distance as the evaluation metric. The
detection rate for 50/100 test words reaches 1 only for high false positive rates, indicating
that a larger test word set should be used. For 200/500 domain labels, 100% detection rate
is achieved at false positive rates of 5-7%.
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f. Kwyjibo Domain Label Analysis
Kwyjibo is a tool to generate random words which can be used as domain labels [36]. The
generated words are seemingly closer to pronounceable words of the english language, in
addition to being random. Thus many such words can be created in a short time. We
anticipate that such a tool can be used by attackers to generate domain labels or domain
names quickly with the aim of defeating our scheme. Therefore, we analyze Kwyjibo based
words, considering them as domain labels belonging to a particular domain.
The names generated by Kwyjibo tool could be accurately characterized by our mea-
sures given sufficient names. Example results are presented in Fig. 12(a) with K-L dis-
tances over unigram distributions. From figure 12(a), we observe that verification with un-
igram frequency can lead to a high detection rate with very low false positive rate. Again,
the performance using 500 labels is the best. We also observe a very steep rise in detection
rates for all the cases. The Kwyjibo domains could be accurately characterized with false
positive rates of 6% or less.
The initial detection rate for Kwyjibo is low as compared to the per-domain analysis.
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Fig. 13. Illustrating benefits of progressive demarcation with JI measure.
This is because the presence of highly probable non-malicious unigrams in Kwyjibo based
domains makes detection difficult at lower false positive rates. The results with other mea-
sures (K-L distance over bigram distributions, JI and edit distances) were similar: kwyjibo
domains could be accurately characterized at false positive rates in the range of 10-12%,
but detection rates were nearly zero at false positive rates of 10% or less.
The scatter plot presented in Fig. 12(b) indicates the clear separation obtained between
non-malicious and malicious domains. The plot represents the Jaccard measure using 500
test words. We highlight the detection of botnet based malicious domains such as Kraken,
MegaD, Pushdo, Srizbi, and Storm. A few well-known non-malicious domains such as
apple.com, cisco.com, stanford.edu, mit.edu, and yahoo.com have also been indicated for
comparison purposes.
g. Progressive Demarcation
The earlier results have showed that good detection rates can be obtained at low false posi-
tive rates once we have 500 or more hostnames of a test domain. As discussed earlier, the
number of hostnames required for our analysis corresponds to latency of accurately char-
acterizing a previously unseen domain. During our experiments, not all the test domains
required 500 hostnames for accurate characterization since the distributions were either
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very close to the good distribution g or bad distribution b. These test domains could be
characterized with a smaller latency (or smaller number of hostnames).
In order to reduce the latency for such domains, we tried an experiment at progressive
demarcation or characterization of the test domains. Intuitively, the idea is to draw two
thresholds above one there are clearly good domains, below the second threshold there
are clearly bad domains and the domains between the two thresholds require more data
(or hostnames) for accurate characterization. These thresholds are progressively brought
closer (or made tighter) as more hostnames become available, allowing more domains to be
accurately characterized until we get 500 or more hostnames for each domain. The results
of such an experiment using the JI measure are shown in Fig. 13.
We establish the lower bound using the formula µb + σb where µb is the mean of JI
values observed for bad or malicious domains and σb is the standard deviation. Similarly,
the upper bound is obtained using the expression µg − σg where the subscript g implies
good domains. Figure 13 shows the detection rate for the considered domains. We see
a monotonically increasing detection rate for both good and bad domains. It is observed
that 85% of bad domains could be so characterized accurately with only 100 hostnames
while only about 23% of good domains can be so characterized with 100 hostnames. In
addition, our experiments indicate that only a small percentage of domains require 200 or
more hostnames for their characterization.
2. Per-IP Analysis
a. Data Set
Here, we present the evaluation of domain names that map to an IP address. For ana-
lyzing the per-IP group, for all hostnames mapping to an IP-address, we use the domain
labels except the top-level domain TLD as the test word. For instance, for hostnames
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physics.university.edu and cse.university.edu mapping to an IP address, say 6.6.6.6, we use
physicsuniversity and cseuniversity as test words. However, we only consider IP addresses
with at least 50 hostnames mapping to it. We found 341 such IP addresses, of which 53
were found to be malicious, and 288 were considered non-malicious. The data is obtained
from DNS traces of a Tier-1 ISP in Asia.
Many hostnames may map to the same IP address. Such a mapping holds for botnets or
other malicious entities utilizing a large set of hostnames mapping to fewer C&C(Command
and Control) servers. It may also be valid for legitimate internet service such as for Con-
tent Delivery Networks (CDNs). We first classify the IPs obtained into two classes of
malicious and non-malicious IPs. The classification is done based on manual checking,
using blacklists, or publicly available Web of Trust information [56]. We manually con-
firm the presence of Conficker based IP addresses and domain names [32]. The ground
truth thus obtained may be used to verify the accuracy of classification. Figure 8 shows
the distribution of non-malicious test words and the randomized distribution is generated
as described previously.
We discuss the results of per-IP analysis below. For the sake of brevity, we present
results based on K-L distances of bigram distributions only. Summary of results from other
metrics is also provided.
The ROC curve for K-L metric shows that bigram distribution can be effective in ac-
curately characterizing the domain names belonging to different IP addresses. We observe
a very clear separation between malicious and non-malicious IPs with 500, and even with
200 test words. With a low false positive rate of 1%, high detection rates of 90% or more
are obtained with 100 or greater number of test words.
The bigram analysis was found to perform better than unigram distributions. The per-
IP bigram analysis performed better than per-domain bigram analysis. We believe that the
bigrams obtained from the ISP dataset provide a comprehensive non-malicious distribution.
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The second-level domain labels also assist in discarding false anomalies, and therefore
provide better accuracy.
The JI measure performed very well, even for small set of test words. The area covered
under the ROC curve was 1 for 200/500 test words. For the experiment with 100 test words,
we achieved the detection rates of 100% with false positive rate of only 2%.
Edit distance with domains mapping to an IP, results in a good performance in general.
The experiments with 100 test words results in a low false positive rate of about 10% for
a 100% detection rate. However for using only 50 test words, the detection rate reaches
about 80% for a high false positive rate of 20%. Thus, we conclude that for per-IP based
analysis, the JI measure performs relatively better than previous measures applied to this
group. However, as highlighted in section G, the time complexity for computing jaccard
index is higher.
3. Summary
For a larger set of test words, the relative order of efficacy of different measures decreases
from JI, to edit distance to K-L distances over bigrams and unigrams. However, inter-
estingly, we observe the exact opposite order when using a small set of test words. For
instance, with 50 test words used for the per-domain analysis, the false positive rates at
which we obtain 100% detection rates, are approximately 50% (JI), 20% (ED), 25% (K-
L with bigram distribution), and 15% (K-L with unigram distribution). Even though the
proof in section H indicates that K-L divergence is an optimal metric for classification, in
practice, it does not hold as the proof is based on the assumption that it is equally likely to
draw a test distribution from a good or a bad distribution.
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Table II. Different types of component classes
Type of class # of compo-
nents
# of IP ad-
dresses
# of domain
names
Types of components found
Many-to-
many
440 11K 35K Legitimate services (Google, Yahoo), CDNs,
Cookie tracking, Mail service, Conficker
botnet
IP fans 1.6K 1.6K 44K Domain Parking, Adult content, Blogs, small
websites
Domain fans 930 8.9K 9.3K CDNs (Akamai), Ebay, Yahoo, Mjuyh bot-
net
Table III. Summary of interesting networks discovered through component analysis
Comp. #Comps. #domains #IPs
type
Con fi cker 1 1.9K 19
botnet
Helldark 1 28 5
botnet
Mjuyh 1 121 1.2K
botnet
Misspelt 5 215 17
Domains
Domain Parking 15 630 15
Adult content 4 349 13
F. Detection via Supervised Learning
As discussed in Section 3 immediately above, the relative merits of each measure vary
depending, for instance, on the number of sub-domains present in a domain being tested.
In this section, we formulate detection of malicious domains (algorithmically generated)
as a supervised learning problem such that we can combine the benefits afforded by each
measure while learning the relative weights of each measure during a training phase. We
divide the one-day long trace from the South Asian Tier-1 ISP in to two halves such that
the first one of 10 hours duration is used for training. We test the learnt model on the
remainder of the trace from South Asian ISP as well as over a different trace from a Tier-1
ISP in South America. In this section, we use the grouping methodology of connected
components, where all “domain name, response IP-address” pairs present during a time
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Table IV. Domain names used by bots
Type of group Domain names
Con fi cker botnet
vddxnvzqjks.ws
gcvwknnxz.biz
joftvvtvmx.org
Mjuyh bot
935c4fe[0-9a-z]+.6.mjuyh.com
c2d026e[0-9a-z]+.6.mjuyh.com
Helldark Trojan
may.helldark.biz
X0R.ircdevils.net
www.BALDMANPOWER.ORG
window (either during training or test phases) are grouped in to connected components.
1. L1-regularized Linear Regression
We formulate the problem of classifying a component as malicious (algorithmically gen-
erated) or legitimate in a supervised learning setting as a linear regression or classification
problem. We first label all domains within the components found in the training data set
by querying against domain reputation sites such as McAfee Site Advisor [57] and Web of
Trust [56] as well as by searching for the URLs on search-engines [58]. Next, we label a
component as good or bad depending on a simple majority count, i.e., if more than 50% of
domains in a component are classified as malicious (adware, malware, spyware, etc.) by
any of the reputation engines, then we label that component as malicious.
Define the set of features as F which includes the following metrics computed for
each component: K-L distance on unigrams, JI measure on bigrams and Edit distance. Also
define the set of Training examples as T and its size in terms of number of components as
|T |. Further, define the output value for each component yi = 1 if it was labeled malicious
or = 0 if legitimate. We model the output value yi for any component i ∈ T as a linear
weighted sum of the values attained by each feature where the weights are given by βj for
each feature j ∈ F : yi =
∑
j∈F βjxj + β0
In particular, we use the LASSO, also known as L1-regularized Linear Regression
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[59], where an additional constraint on each feature allows us to obtain a model with lower
test prediction errors than the non-regularized linear regression since some variables can
be adaptively shrunk towards lower values. We use 10-fold cross validation to choose the
value of the regularization parameter λ ∈ [0-1] that provides the minimum training error
(equation below) and then use that λ value in our tests:
argmin
β
|T |∑
i=1
(yi − β0 −
∑
j∈F
βjxj)
2 + λ
∑
j∈F
|βj|. (3.2)
2. Results
First, note the various connected components present in the South Asian trace as classified
in to three classes: IP fans, Domain fans, and Many-to-many components in Table II.
During the training phase, while learning the LASSO model, we mark 128 components as
good (these consist of CDNs, mail service providers, large networks such as Google) and
one component belonging to the Conficker botnet as malicious. For each component, we
compute the features of K-L divergence, Jaccard Index measure, and Edit distance. We
train the regression model using glmnet tool [59] in statistical package R, and obtain the
value for the regularization parameter λ as 1e− 4, that minimizes training error during the
training phase. We then test the model on the remaining portion of the one day long trace.
In this regard, our goal is to check if our regression model can not only detect Conficker
botnet but whether it can also detect other malicious domain groups during the testing phase
over the trace. During the testing stage, if a particular component is flagged as suspicious
then we check against Web of Trust [56], McAfee Site Advisor [57] as well as via Whois
queries, search engines, to ascertain the exact behavior of the component. Next, we explain
the results of each of the classes individually.
On applying our model to the rest of the trace, 29 components (out of a total of 3K
components) are classified as malicious, and we find 27 of them to be malicious after
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cross checking with external sources (Web of Trust, McAfee, etc.) while two components
(99 domains) are false positives and comprise of Google and domains belonging to news
blogs. Note that here we use a broad definition of malicious domains as those that could
be used for any nefarious purposes on the web, i.e., we do not necessarily restrict the
definition to only include botnet domain generation algorithm. Out of the 27 components
that were classified as malicious, one of them corresponds to the Conficker botnet, which is
as expected since our training incorporated features learnt from Conficker. We next provide
details on the remaining 26 components that were determined as malicious (see Table III).
Mjuyh Botnet: The most interesting discovery from our component analysis is that
of another Botnet, which we call Mjuyh, since they use the domain name mjuyh.com (see
Table IV). The fourth-level domain label is generated randomly and is 57 characters long.
Each of the 121 domain names belonging to this bot network return 10 different IP ad-
dresses on a DNS query for a total of 1.2K IP-addresses. Also, in some replies, there are
invalid IP addresses like 0.116.157.148. All the 10 IP addresses returned for a given do-
main name, belong to different network prefixes. Furthermore, there is no intersection in
the network prefixes between the different domain names of the mjuyh bot. We strongly
suspect that this is a case of “domain fluxing” along with “IP fast fluxing”, where each
bot generated a different randomized query which was resolved to a different set of IP-
addresses.
Helldark Trojan: We discovered a component containing five different third-level
domains (a few sample domain names are as shown in Table IV). The component comprises
of 28 different domain names which were all found to be spreading multiple trojans. One
such trojan spread by these domains is Win32/Hamweq.CW that spreads via removable
drives, such as USB memory sticks. They also have an IRC-based backdoor, which may
be used by a remote attacker directing the affected machine to participate in Distributed
Denial of Service attacks, or to download and execute arbitrary files [60].
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Mis-spelt component: There are about five components (comprising 220 domain
names) which used tricked (mis-spelt or slightly different spelling) names of reputed do-
main names. For example, these components use domain names such as uahoo.co.uk to
trick users trying to visit yahoo.co.uk (since the alphabet ‘u’ is next to the alphabet ‘y’,
they expect users to enter this domain name by mistake). Dizneyland.com is used to mis-
direct users trying to visit Disneyland.com (which replaces the alphabet ‘s’ with alphabet
‘z’). We still consider these components as malicious since they comprise of domains that
exhibit unusual alphanumeric features.
Domain Parking: We found 15 components (630 domain names) that were being
used for domain parking, i.e., a practice where users register for a domain name without
actually using it, in which case the registrar’s IP-address is returned as the DNS response.
In these 15 components, one belongs to GoDaddy (66 domain names), 13 of them belong
to Sedo domain parking (510 domain names) and one component belongs to OpenDNS
(57 domain names). Clearly these components represent something abnormal as there are
many domains with widely disparate algorithmic features clustered together on account of
the same IP-address they are mapped to.
Adult Content: We find four components that comprise of 349 domains primarily
used for hosting adult content sites. Clearly this matches the well known fact, that in the
world of adult site hosting, the same set of IP-addresses are used to host a vast number of
domains, each of which in turn may use very different words in an attempt to drive traffic.
In addition, for comparison purposes, we used the lexical features of the domain names
such as the length of the domain names, number of dots and the length of the second-level
domain name (for example, xyz.com) for training on the same ISP trace, instead of using
the K-L divergence, JI measure and Edit distance measures used in our study. These lexical
features were found to be useful in an earlier study in identifying malicious URLs [38].
The model trained on these lexical features correctly labeled four components as malicious
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(Conficker bot network, three adult content components and one component containing
mis-spelt domain names) during the testing phase, but it also resulted in 30 components
which were legitimate as being labeled incorrectly; compare this against 27 components
that were correctly classified as malicious and two that were false positives on using our
alphanumeric features.
We also test our model on a trace obtained from a South America based Tier-1 ISP.
This trace is about 20 hours long and is collected on a smaller scale as compared to the
ISP trace from Asia. The time lag between the capture of S. American Tier-1 ISP trace
and the previously used ISP trace from Asia, is about 15 days. We use the same training
set for the prediction model as we use for the ISP trace from Asia. In the prediction stage,
we successfully detect the Conficker component with no false positives. The Conficker
component has 185 domain names and 10 IP addresses. Of the 10 IP addresses determined
for the Conficker component of the South American trace, nine are common with the Asia
ISP trace’s Conficker component. We conclude that Conficker based C&C servers have
relatively large TTLs. However, out of the 185 domain names only five domains are com-
mon from this component and the component from the ISP trace from Asia. Clearly, the
Conficker botnet exhibits rapid domain fluxing. Overall, this experiment shows that a train-
ing model learnt in one network can be applied to a completely different network and still
successfully detect malicious domain groups.
G. Discussion
1. Usefulness of Component Analysis
Conficker botnet, present in our ISP trace, employs domain fluxing across TLDs, that be-
came directly visible after IP-domain components were extracted and analyzed from the
trace. The component analysis allowed the application of our detection methods across
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several different domains, which otherwise would have been separated from each other.
In addition, component analysis allowed us to detect Conficker domains that would not
have been detectable with our approach when applied to domain names alone since some
of these domains contained fewer than 50 names needed for accurate analysis. Similarly,
some of the IP addresses in the component hosted fewer than 50 names and would not have
been detected with the IP address based analysis either. However, these domains will be
included in the component analysis as long as the component has altogether more than 50
names.
Let Dc be the number of hostnames and Ic be the number of IP addresses in the
component. IfDd, Id are the number of hostnames and corresponding IP addresses detected
through domain level analysis, we define domain level completeness ratios as Dd/Dc and
Id/Ic. Similarly, we can define the completeness ratios for IP-based analysis as Di/Dc and
Ii/Ic, where Di and Ii correspond to the total number of hostnames and IP addresses of the
Conficker botnet detected by the IP-based analysis.
For the Conficker botnet, these completeness ratios for IP-based analysis were 73.68%
for IP addresses and 98.56% for hostnames. This implies that we are able to detect an
additional 26.32% of IP addresses and a relatively small fraction of 1.44% of hostnames
for those IP addresses. The completeness ratios for domain based analysis were found to
be 100% for IP addresses and 83.87% for the hostnames. Therefore, we do 16.13% better
in terms of determining the hostnames using the per-domain analysis. This shows that the
component level analysis provides additional value in analyzing the trace for malicious
domains.
2. Complexity of Various Measures
Table V identifies the computational complexity for every metric, and for all groups that
we use. We observe that K-L metrics analyzing unigram and bigram distributions can be
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Notation
A Alphabet size
W Maximum word size
K Number of test words
K’ Number of test words in a component
Sg Number of words in non-malicious database
Table V. Computational complexity of detection metrics
Grp. K-L K-L JI EDunigram bigram
dom. O(KW O(KW+ O(KW 2Sg) O(K2W 2)
+A) A2)
IP O(KW O(KW+ O(KW 2Sg) O(K2W 2)
+A) A2)
Com. O(K ′W O(K ′W O(K ′W 2Sg) O(K ′2W 2)
+A) +A2)
computed fairly efficiently. However, for the JI measure, the size of the non-malicious
database largely influences the time taken to compute the measure. A good database size
results in a higher accuracy, at the cost of increased time taken for analysis. Similarly, edit
distance takes longer for large word lengths, and the number of test words. However, it is
independent of any database, hence the space requirements are smaller.
We briefly describe how we determine the bounds as expressed in Table V for the per-
domain group. For the K-L unigram analysis since we examine every character of every
test word, the complexity is bounded by KW . We then compute, for every character in
the alphabet A, the divergence values. Therefore, we obtain the complexity as O(KW +
A). Bigram distribution based K-L divergence is calculated similarly except that the new
alphabet size is A2. While calculating the Jaccard index, note that the number of bigrams
obtained is O(W −1). For each bigram, we examine the queues pointing to words from the
non-malicious database. Thus, for each bigram, we examine O(WSg) bigrams. Since we
do it for K test words, we obtain O(KW 2Sg). For every test word used while obtaining the
edit distance, we examine it against the K - 1 test words. Therefore, the total complexity
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is simply O(K2W 2). The expressions for per-IP and per-component groups are obtained
analogously.
It is interesting to note that A is of the size 36 (0-9, a-z characters). K used in our
analysis varies as 50/100/200/500. However, the average value for K’ is higher in compari-
son. The DNS PTR dataset considered for per-domain analysis has approximately 469,000
words used for training purposes. This helps us estimate Sg. For the ISP dataset, Sg is of
the order of 11522 words. An estimate of W for the DNS PTR dataset is obtained from
figure 9.
H. Proof of K-L divergence as being the Optimal Classifier
Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , aM} denote M the letters of the alphabet from which the domain
names are chosen (in our case, this is English alphabet with spaces and special characters).
Let g = [g1, g2, . . . , gM ] and b = [b1, b2, . . . , bM ] be the distribution of the letters in the
good and bad domains, respectively. Let x be the actual domain name of length N , that
has to be classified as being good or bad. Let the letter ai appear ni times in x such that
∑
i ni = N . Let q = [q1, q2, . . . , qM ] be the distribution of the different letters in x, i.e.,
qi = ni/N .
Under the assumption that a priori, x can belong to a good or bad domain with equal
probability, the classifier that minimizes the probability of error (wrong classification) is
given by the maximum-likelihood classifier which classifies x according to
P (x|g)
g
≷
b
P (x|b) (3.3)
Intuitively, x is classified as good, if it is more likely to have resulted from the good distri-
bution than from the bad distribution. The above classifier can be specified in terms of the
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likelihood ratio given by
λ(x) =
P (x|g)
P (x|b)
g
≷
b
1 (3.4)
As we will see later, it is easier to work with an equivalent quantity 1
N
log λ(x). The classi-
fier is then given according to
1
N
log λ(x) =
1
N
log
P (x|g)
P (x|b)
g
≷
b
0 (3.5)
Under the assumption that the letters in x have been generated independently from the
same distribution, P (x|g) is given by
P (x|g) =
N∏
k=1
P (xk|g) =
M∏
i=1
P (ai|g)
ni =
M∏
i=1
gnii =
M∏
i=1
gqiNi . (3.6)
The second equality follows by grouping all the occurrences of the letters ai together and
recall that there are ni such occurrences. Similarly,
P (x|b) =
N∏
k=1
P (xk|b) =
M∏
i=1
P (ai|b)
ni =
M∏
i=1
bnii =
M∏
i=1
bqiNi . (3.7)
Using (3.6) and (3.7) in (3.5), the log-likelihood ratio can be seen to be
1
N
log λ(x) =
1
N
log
P (x|g)
P (x|b)
= log
∏M
i=1 g
qi
i∏M
i=1 b
qi
i
(3.8)
Dividing the numerator and the denominator by
∏
i qi
qi
, we get
1
N
log λ(x) = log
∏M
i=1
(
gi
qi
)qi
∏M
i=1
(
bi
qi
)qi (3.9)
=
∑
i
qi log
gi
qi
−
∑
i
qi log
bi
qi
(3.10)
= D(q|b)−D(q|g) (3.11)
where D(q|b) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the two distributions.
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Thus, the optimal classifier given in (3.5) is equivalent to
D(q|b)−D(q|g)
g
≷
b
0 (3.12)
This result is intuitively pleasing since the classifier essentially computes the KL “dis-
tance” between q and the two distributions and chooses the one that is ‘closer’.
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CHAPTER IV
WINNING WITH DNS FAILURES: STRATEGIES FOR FASTER BOTNET
DETECTION
A. Introduction
To automate the domain name generation for fluxing, botnet owners rely on generating do-
main names algorithmically which exhibit high information entropy. Reverse engineering
of bot executables may yield the domain name generation algorithm and subsequently the
domain names that a bot may query in the future. These domain names may be blacklisted
or pre-registered in advance by security researchers. Domain fluxing botnets overcome this
vulnerability by choosing to generate a large number of names, where only a few of them
may host the C&C server. The large number of domain names is expected to overwhelm
the pre-registration by others and potentially provide a cover for the actual name of the
C&C server used by the botnet.
Botnets that employ domain fluxing can be characterized by the following two impor-
tant features: (a) The alphanumeric distribution or entropy of the domain names for C&C
servers is considerably different from human generated names. (b) The bots generate many
failed DNS queries as many of the algorithmically generated domain names may not be reg-
istered or not available as C&C servers. Figure 14 highlights the behavior of a bot belong
to a domain fluxing botnet. We observe multiple DNS queries issued by the bot, to obtain
the location (IP address) of the C&C server. The bot may continue to issue the queries until
one of them would resolve successfully, after which the bot may choose to sleep or proceed
with an attack. We exploit the above described two important properties to detect botnets
with very low latency, where we define latency as the number of domain names required
for successful anomaly detection (or the time taken to collect those domains).
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Fig. 14. Sample set of queries seen from an infected host within the AS.
With our approach, we analyze successful DNS queries, and the failed DNS queries
within the vicinity of the successful queries, thus exploiting their features to not only de-
tect the C&C servers of those botnets faster, but also simultaneously detect bots within the
network. While our detection mechanism is designed specifically to detect domain flux-
ing botnets by utilizing DNS failures, previous approaches relying only on domain entropy
analysis can still be used in the event that there are no DNS failures. By analyzing the
failed queries along with the successful queries, we increase the data available for analysis
and hence speed up the detection process. While our technique can be used online (or in
real-time), we focus on a trace-driven evaluation methodology here to keep the explanation
simpler. Additionally, our analysis is based only on DNS network traffic, thereby reduc-
ing resource requirements, in comparison to techniques relying on general network traffic
analysis.
When individual clients/hosts query a resolver, the failed queries can potentially be at-
tributed to the presence of bots on that client and the successful queries close to the failures
can be assumed to be related with high confidence. However, when queries are forwarded
to a resolver from another local resolver or a DNS query aggregator, the queries from many
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clients can be grouped together and relating failed queries to other successful queries in
the query stream becomes problematic. Our approach is cognizant of this difficulty and is
capable of producing accurate results in the presence of aggregated query streams.
The main contributions of this work are:
• We utilize the failures around successful DNS queries and the entropy of the do-
mains belonging to such queries, for detecting botnets with lower latency compared
to previous techniques.
• We propose and evaluate a speeding technique which correlates DNS domain query
failures for faster detection of domain fluxing botnets’ C&C server IPs. We utilize
temporal correlation between DNS queries and entropy-based correlation between
domain names, for speedier detection.
• We show through a trace driven analysis that the proposed techniques can consider-
ably speed up the detection of botnets that generate many DNS query failures. This
in turn will constrain the domain name generation algorithms further if they want to
evade detection by techniques such as proposed here.
We apply our techniques to two datasets. The first is a Tier-1 ISP dataset obtained
from South Asia, captured for a period of approximately one day. Additionally, we ana-
lyze a university campus DNS trace captured over a month. The datasets consist of botnets
validated through previous techniques applied to the trace [61]. Based on our analysis, we
detect the presence of the recently discovered Conficker botnet. Our experiments indicate
a false positive rate as low as 0.02% with a high detection rate. Our evaluation also yields
how different features characterizing botnets can be varied, to assist a network administra-
tor in tuning these parameters for their network(s).
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B. Related Work
Alphabet entropy measures to detect algorithmically generated botnets by using success-
ful domain name queries mapping to IP addresses, are proposed in [61]. Jiang et al. [62]
use DNS failures to determine suspicious activity within the local autonomous system.
Their technique analyzes bipartite graphs between failed DNS domain names and querying
clients, to determine connected components with anomalous activity. Our approach, addi-
tionally, analyzes related successful queries and detects the botnet C&C servers along with
the bots. The authors in [63] analyze unproductive network traffic of multiple protocols to
classify malicious hosts based on features such as rate of failed traffic generation, entropy
of ports used etc. In our work, we do not require training of data, and only rely on DNS
based features for botnet detection.
Botnet identification using DNS has been explored in [64] where the authors utilize
query rates based features of successful and failed DNS queries, to identify botnet anoma-
lies. [65] detects new bots based on the similarity in querying behavior for known malicious
hosts. Our technique does not rely on query rates and can detect botnets even if each bot
queries for an independent botnet C&C server’s domain names. Previous work on botnet
detection has also examined the correlation of network activity between time and space
as exhibited by users within a network [66]. We, however, use only the DNS traffic for
detecting botnet activity, drastically reducing the resource requirements. Also, DNS secu-
rity has been investigated in a number of recent studies [67] which have focused on DNS
indirection and cache poisoning prevention.
C. Methodology
In this section, we describe our technique for detecting botnets through DNS traffic analysis
using successful and failed DNS queries. We also highlight correlating failed domains, for
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faster detection of malicious IP addresses. In section D, we highlight the improvement in
latency obtained by using failed DNS queries. Our primary goal is to detect the IP address
of a domain fluxing botnet’s C&C server. As a consequence of our analysis, we obtain the
bots within the local network, and the domain names belonging to the botnet, thus exposing
the botnet altogether. To discover anomalous IP address(es), we exploit multiple features
such as the botnet structure, related domain name feature, and the temporal correlation
between DNS query patterns of participating bots.
Our technique applies multiple filters to the DNS dataset used for evaluation (see
Figure 15). At each stage (identified by a filter), we discard the set of IP addresses which
do not exhibit malicious behavior as expected by the filter. Our filters are motivated by the
structure and functioning of domain fluxing botnets. Since our primary goal is to identify
botnet’s C&C server address, we analyze information with respect to an IP address returned
as the response in a DNS packet. Every candidate IP address (denoted by cncip) may be
classified as malicious or benign when subject to these filters. Our approach can be suitably
modified to consider candidate malicious domains on grouping them by sub-domains or the
connected-components of bipartite graphs (between the set of domains and IP addresses
they resolve to), thus exposing IP-fluxing botnets as well.
As an early indicator for domain fluxing, we use the number of domain names map-
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ping to an IP address (Dcncip) as an initial filter. We call this as the degree of the cncip.
Since a C&C server IP address of interest to us, will have multiple domain names mapped
to it owing to domain fluxing, an IP address with a high Dcncip insinuates greater mali-
ciousness. Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) behave similarly and thus our additional
filters help exclude such non-rogue entities.
Based on the behavior observed within the DNS datasets (as also illustrated in Figure
15), we note that a number of DNS queries are likely to fail around a successful resolution
of a C&C server address. Hence, we look to see if a potential C&C IP address returned
as a DNS response, has a high temporal correlation with failed queries. For every cncip,
we analyze the time series or the sequence of DNS packets for all querying DNS clients
(where a cncip occurs) and thus compute the correlation measure (Corrcncip). A higher
correlation (larger Corrcncip) is used as an indicator of botnet-like DNS querying pattern.
When domain-fluxing botnets employ random name generation algorithms, the do-
main names exhibit high information entropy. We measure the entropy present in both the
successful DNS queries for the IP address being analyzed (the entropy being denoted by
SENcncip) and that of the temporally correlated failed queries (denoted by FENcncip). We
use normalized edit distance to measure entropy. The computation of this metric does not
require a reference or training with external sources, and thus can be applied independently.
The normalized edit distance metric measures the transformation required to convert one
string to another, normalized over the length of the longer string. Thus, for a given set of
strings, normalized edit distance computed over all pairs belonging to the set, measures the
intra-domain entropy for the set. For SENcncip calculation, we apply this metric for all
pairs of successful domain names (which map to cncip). Thus, the analyzed IP address
is considered to be suspicious if the observed SENcncip value is close to 1.0. Similarly,
we calculate FENcncip by computing the normalized edit distance between pairs of failed
domain name strings, present within the vicinity of the successful DNS queries (related to
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cncip). Using the same Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), the entropy observed for a
botnet’s failed queries is expected to be similar to that of succeeding queries. As outlined
in section 2, this hypothesis may be used for correlating relevant domain names for faster
detection.
The temporal correlation between the set of DNS failures (FQcncip) and successes
(SQcncip), and the subsequent requirement of proximity between entropy computed for
FQcncip and SQcncip, extracts relevant information from the network traffic, in spite of the
presence of DNS aggregators within the autonomous system (AS). It is noteworthy that
for query streams seen from aggregators, legitimate IP addresses may be accompanied by
failures more often, and thus cncips which have high entropy for SQcncip and FQcncip, can
be labelled malicious by satisfying the criterion set by our detection filters. However, as
we shall note in section D, we obtain reasonable false positive rates.
Prior to subjecting the set of IP addresses extracted from DNS responses, to the fil-
ters used for detection, we also white-list packets for a set of well-known domain names
and IP addresses. The 31 domain names present in our white-list comprise of known be-
nign second-level domains (such as facebook.com, apple.com) and several DNS blacklist
(DNSBL) service domains such as spamhaus.org, uribl.com. Inclusion of DNSBLs dis-
cards failures that may otherwise produce noise during analysis. We also discard RFC
1918 (private) addresses from analysis [68]. The details of the filtering steps are described
below in more detail.
1. Filtering Steps
Figure 15 demonstrates the steps involved in narrowing down the set of IP addresses that
are returned in DNS response packets (post white-listing), to a relatively smaller list of
anomalous IP addresses. With each filter, we select a fraction of the input supplied by the
previous filter, reducing the subsequent burden. In the following subsections, we describe
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each filter applied for a candidate C&C IP address (denoted by cncip) resulting in cncip
being discarded as legitimate or subject to additional filters. The measures employed by
each filter, are either computed using select or all the time windows in which the candidate
IP address occurs. For instance, we may discard those bins from analysis where we do
not observe enough failed DNS queries for analysis. The typical time bin/window length
used in our trace may vary depending upon the dataset in consideration. For evaluation
presented in section D, we typically use a 128 sec window (64 sec symmetric about cncip).
The following subsections detail how each measure is computed.
a. Degree of an IP address (Dcncip):
Domain fluxing is characterized by multiple domain names mapping to an IP address. We
define the degree of an IP address as the number of domain names that map to a cncip.
As a first filter, we use the degree (F1 in Figure 15) to separate a set of IP addresses more
likely to exhibit botnet like domain fluxing. For a given IP address, this number may vary
based on the length of the trace analyzed. For instance, an IP address analyzed for an hour
may have five domain names mapping to it. However, if analyzed for two hours, eight
domain names may map to it, which includes previously expired domain names. While
we consider the IPs which have a degree of at least two, we vary Dcncip to evaluate how
quickly we detect anomalies. For a typical analysis, we use a degree threshold of eight,
independent of the time for which a candidate IP address is analyzed. Thus, the filter F1
can be bypassed if an IP has less than eight domain names mapping to it. However, this puts
a constraint on the fluxing that a botnet server can exhibit. It should be noted that, Content
Distribution Networks (CDNs) also have a high degree. However, CDNs get separated
through additional filters as described ahead.
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b. Correlation Metric (Corrcncip):
As introduced earlier, bots generate burst of DNS queries, a fraction of which may fail.
Thus, we exploit the temporal correlation between DNS successes and failures to identify
malicious behavior. On observing a time window of DNS queries for a bot, we may observe
the presence of failures, more frequently, than for legitimate clients. It is represented by
filter F2 in Figure 15.
The correlation metric (Corrcncip) for a candidate IP address is computed as the proba-
bility of observing at least one failed DNS query in a time bin, given that cncipwas returned
as an answer to a successful DNS query in the same bin. For detection, we heuristically
choose the threshold as 0.5 implying that majority of windows in which a cncip appears,
should also have failures for it to be considered a meaningful anomaly. In section D, we
study how the false positives decrease on increasing this threshold or when the correlation
metric changes upon restricting our analysis to windows with more failures.
We use the following equation to compute this metric:
Corrcncip =
∑
Time bins with (Scncip ∩ Fclient)
Time bins with Scncip
(4.1)
where Scncip denotes the boolean condition of whether cncip occurs in a time bin.
Fclient refers to the boolean variable indicating the presence of at least one failure in the
corresponding time bin for the client. The correlation metric is computed with the time
series of all clients which receive cncip as the DNS response address. This metric may
not be sufficient in topologies comprising of DNS aggregators where the temporal co-
occurrence of DNS failures and successes is more frequent. Further developed measures
limit the errors produced due to DNS aggregators.
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c. Succeeding Domain Set Entropy (SENcncip):
We use edit distance as a metric for determining the similarity between a pair of domain
names. Algorithmically generated domains exhibit a high value for this metric, owing to
limited similarity between a given pair of domains. However, domain names observed for a
legitimate entity, frequently have repeated occurrence of certain characters, which lower the
computed normalized edit distance (or the entropy associated with the entity), as substanti-
ated by [61]. For instance, a pair of domain names such as www.google.com, ns.google.com
have a lower normalized edit distance than a pair like jswrts.ws, yvqcbtvztpm.cc, as ob-
served for Conficker.
Edit distance is defined as an integral value indicating the number of transformations
required to convert a given string to the other. The type of eligible transformations include
addition, deletion, and modification of a character. We use the normalized edit distance
measure computed as the Levenshtein edit distance [53] between a pair of strings normal-
ized by the length of the longer string. The entropy of domains mapping to an IP address
(and hence successful DNS queries), SENcncip, is determined by computing the normal-
ized edit distance between every pair of domains that map to cncip (taken from set with
cardinality |Dcncip|), and averaged over all such pairs. Therefore, the complexity of entropy
calculation is O(n2) where n is the number of domain names successfully mapping to an
IP address over the duration of analysis. This duration is defined either in terms of a pre-
determined time, or the first few successful domains encountered for a given cncip. Once
SENcncip is computed, if it exceeds a threshold (reserved for highly domain fluxing enti-
ties), we consider it for further analysis. Our evaluation shows that while high SENcncip
IPs may be detected easily, even entities with relatively low entropy are detected with small
false positive rates, making it difficult for botnet owners to improve their domain generation
algorithm (DGA).
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d. Failing Domain Set Entropy (FENcncip):
For a botnet, the domain name generation algorithm for failed domain names is no differ-
ent than the domain names successfully resolved. The features expressed through alphanu-
meric characters composing the failed and successful DNS queries generated by a botnet,
are therefore very similar. Thus, the failed domain names can help reduce the latency of
analysis and improve detection since many more names can be analyzed in a shorter period
of time, when associated with the succeeding queries.
To compute the entropy of failed domain names (denoted as FENcncip), we analyze
the failing queries that occur in the vicinity of a successful DNS query. Our hypothesis is as
follows. For a bot issuing a burst of DNS queries to determine the C&C server address, the
entropy of failed DNS queries present in the burst, is of the same order as the entropy of the
successful queries. We again use the normalized edit distance for determining the entropy
of failed domain names present in a time bin containing successful query resolution. It is
symmetric about the time instant where cncip was observed. It is noteworthy that all failed
DNS queries present in the time bin, may not be related to the successful DNS query. Such
queries deviate the output. The noise is especially amplified at DNS aggregators which
query on behalf of several individual local clients. Thus, choosing an appropriate time
window length is critical for accurate analysis. During evaluation, we show how changing
window size affects the performance.
To compute the failed domain entropy (FEN) for a candidate C&C IP address, we use
the following equation:
FENcncip =
∑
(FENclient)
Number of clients
(4.2)
where FENclient is the FEN value computed by examining client’s time series of
query generation, with respect to cncip. To elaborate, the failed query entropy for a client
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is computed between pairs of strings (failed domain names) present within every time win-
dow in which cncip occurs. Subsequently, all such FEN values are averaged thus giving
FENcncip. The computation of this entropy requires at least two failed domain names
within the window of consideration. A higher number of failures increase the confidence
in the computed FEN value for that window implying that botnets are detected more ac-
curately. Alternately, individual failed queries can be directly compared with the candidate
successful domain names to compute the edit distance relevant to each failed domain name.
We have evaluated both approaches and obtained similar results.
To further filter the candidate set of anomalous IP addresses, we consider only those
addresses with FENcncip greater than a threshold. We choose a conservative threshold to
avoid ignoring genuine anomalies. To apply our hypothesis of the proximity of SENcncip
and FENcncip, we use the following inequality to further eliminate false positives:
(SENcncip − δ) ≤ FENcncip ≤ (SENcncip + δ) (4.3)
where δ represents a small bound or the proximity within whichFENcncip and SENcncip
are expected to lie. To choose an appropriate δ, we compute the standard deviation σ of
entropy for domains belonging to the known botnet IPs present in our dataset. Thereby, we
choose δ as 3σ.
From the above description, the temporal correlation and entropy related parameters
are analyzed and IPs satisfying the outlined malicious criteria, help in identifying bots
within the network as well. In an autonomous system, where the DNS queries are observed
from local clients and DNS aggregators, our technique may be applied recursively at the
aggregator, yielding the bots which use the aggregator as their DNS recursive resolver.
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2. Correlating Failures for Improved Latency
Here, we present an alternate strategy for speeding up the detection technique which re-
lies only on successful queries. The work in the previous chapter [61] emphasizes upon
applying statistical techniques such as K-L divergence, Jaccard Index, and Edit distance,
to the set of successful domains for a cncip (SQcncip). Through evaluation, it is shown
that a large set improves the accuracy of anomaly detection. However, accumulating a
larger set requires a considerable amount of time. Therefore, we propose supplementing
the set SQcncip with failed queries that occur within the vicinity of successful DNS queries.
The resulting set is accumulated faster, decreasing the latency of analysis by an order of
magnitude.
The detection technique proposed in this chapter provides the basis for temporally
associating the failed queries with successfully resolving DNS queries. This implies that
only those failed DNS queries may be considered which occur around the time at which
the successful DNS query, containing the IP address under analysis, occurs. In addition to
temporal characteristics, to improve the quality of failed domain name set, we propose con-
sidering only those failing domains within the time window, whose entropy characteristics
are similar to the successful domain set. Such similarity parameters for entropy can help
identify a DGA by empirically noting the entropy expressed by domains generated using
the DGA. Here, we explore supplementing SQcncip with the temporal and entropy-based
features. Additional features as described for detection can also be used.
To realize the faster accumulation of relevant domains, we compute the entropy (nor-
malized edit distance) between a failed domain name and each of the successful DNS do-
main names discovered under analysis. A domain yielding an entropy value close to the
average SEN (or the entropy of successful domains) is considered relevant. The measure
of closeness is defined using eqn. 4.3 as described above. For this particular experiment,
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Table VI. Trace description.
ISP trace Campus trace
Trace collection period Nov 03-04, 2009 Aug 22 - Sep 22, 2010
Total number of DNS sessions 1.61 M 112.7 M
White-listed sessions 770.23 K 54.4 M
Total number of failed DNS packets after white-listing 57.72 K 1.28 M
IP addresses analyzed for maliciousness 9948 74.7 K (per segment avg.)
Number of clients (or aggregators) 8472 1735 (per segment avg.)
we choose δ = σ. Such computation with little additional overhead for identifying rele-
vant domains may improve latency and accuracy. We evaluate this correlation strategy for
Conficker’s C&C server addresses in section D. Note that the manual analysis of discarded
failed domain names identifies irrelevant queries belonging to services like qq.com and
ask.com, which do not appear to exhibit the malicious domain fluxing. We also note that
only a few domains belonging to Conficker are discarded, strengthening our confidence in
the new set.
D. Results
We validate our technique using the DNS datasets described below. For our analysis, we
consider only DNS type A records. Several DNS blacklist based services utilize the A
record to verify whether an IP address, domain name, or an executable (a feature used by
McAfee) is present in the blacklists. To exclude these queries from analysis, we white-
list a total of 31 trusted second-level domain names including several blacklist services,
Content Distribution Network services (such as akamai.net, cloudfront.net) and popular
domains (such as google.com, facebook.com). The white-list helps us focus on other po-
tentially malicious domains, in addition to refining the failed domains set used for analysis.
Additionally, we avoid processing answers with RFC 1918 (private) addresses [68].
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1. Data Sets
Table VI details the traces used for analysis. The 20-hour long ISP trace contains known
malicious IPs belonging to the Conficker botnet. Using a blacklist, we obtain a set of 100
odd IPs labelled malicious, which we further verify manually by checking against exhaus-
tive databases such as robtex.com and mywot.com. We believe that these two sources pro-
vide us with the most recent information concerning the queried domains or IP addresses.
The 19 IPs obtained post verification with the above sources, contain two IP addresses
hosting adult websites. We disregard these as benign due to their non-fluxing behavior.
One C&C address apparently belongs to the domain-fluxing Kraken/Bobax botnet (based
on the domain names we see). However, the Kraken C&C address has a degree of only
two. The 16 remaining IPs belong to Conficker, some of which are sinkhole servers [69].
Nonetheless, we consider them as anomalous as they help keep the botnet alive. As a result,
we consider the remaining 9931 IPs as legitimate. Note that all IPs considered for ground
truth evaluation, have a degree of at least two.
We also use a DNS trace captured at a primary recursive resolver of a university net-
work. We divide the month-long trace into approximately week-long segments and present
our results on randomly chosen segments. Each segment contains an average of 295K IP
addresses returned as DNS responses (after white-listing). As table VI shows, approxi-
mately 75K IP addresses have degree Dcncip > 2. For the campus trace, we use the C&C
server information from the ISP trace to obtain 29 IP addresses (out of 75K), labelled as
malicious. Since the ground truth information for the ISP trace is relatively old, we again
verify this set manually. As a result, we are left with four Conficker C&C addresses which
are common with those present in the ISP trace.
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Fig. 16. Latency comparison (a) for different number of domain names. (b) for 200 domain
names.
2. Latency Comparison
The latency of detection is expressed in terms of the number of successful domain names
required to analyze and detect a rogue server accurately. Figure 16(a) shows the gain
obtained in terms of time taken to collect a set of botnet domain names. The figure shows
two classes of botnet IPs that we observe. Class I represents those C&C server addresses
where domain fluxing yielded both successful and failed queries. However, for the C&C
server in Class II, the bots issued none or very few failed DNS queries. In our ISP trace with
more than 50 domain names mapping to it, we find eight C&C server addresses belonging
to Class I and two belonging to Class II. Also, we observe that all four C&C addresses in
the analyzed campus trace segment belong to Class I.
Figure 16(a) shows the improved latency for the average time taken by Class I or II
addresses. From the figure, we observe that when failed domain names are correlated with
successful DNS domains, the time taken to collect 50, 100, 200 or 500 domain names is
considerably reduced. Especially, for 500 domain names, we see a gain of an order of
magnitude when the time of collection reduces from approximately 54000 secs to only
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Fig. 17. (a) ROC curve for changing correlation thresholds. (b) Correlation comparison for
changing flux behavior.
4600 secs. With Class II, however, we do not observe any gain since no failures help
in supplementing the set of successful botnet domains. Thus, we infer that in context of
applying statistical techniques for anomaly detection, the proposed correlation mechanism
can significantly reduce the time to collect input required for analysis of Class I C&C
addresses. Note that we do not obtain 500 successful domains for the Class II addresses.
The analysis with the campus trace follows analogous behavior. However, we plot the
latency observed when correlating failures with successes, using the criterion highlighted
in sub-section 2. We also note a higher initial latency for domain name collection, owing to
slower traffic seen for a campus (Tier-4) as compared to a Tier-1 network trace. Although
the traffic is slower, the time of collection is reduced considerably even with the campus
trace. For instance, we observe 100 domains are collected 10K seconds faster than when
using only successful DNS traffic.
While figure 16(a) shows average time taken for Class I and II anomalous entities,
figure 16(b) shows the pace at which those anomalies are detected, for the specific case of
200 domain names. From the figure, we see that using the both successful and failed DNS
domains, we can detect more than 80% of the total IP addresses, an order of magnitude
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faster than when using only the successful ones. We note that the cumulative detection
reaches 100% because of the presence of Class II addresses.
From the figures, we conclude that considering failed domain names assists in speed-
ing up detection of a domain-fluxing botnet. While speeding up the detection through meth-
ods presented in [61], the worst case detection latency is same as the original latency where
only domains from SQcncip are used. We also transform botnet detection to a real-time
detection approach through the speeding mechanism presented above, as well as through
the detection strategy.
3. Effect of the Correlation Parameter
We evaluate the significance of using the correlation as a feature for anomaly detection.
Figure 17(a) represents the ROC curve for changing thresholds for correlation between
DNS successes and failures. The ROC curve shows a decrease in false positive rate with
a decreasing detection rate, when increasing Corrcncip thresholds. A higher threshold re-
quirement would imply that failures coincide with the successful queries more frequently.
We would expect benign IP addresses to have a low correlation value. Hence, increasing
the threshold results in decreasing false positives. For this particular experiment, we note
detecting a maximum of 12 (out of 17 C&C IPs) as the remaining IPs do not have enough
domain names for analysis (at least eight domains). We also note a maximum false positive
rate of only 0.6% which primarily comprises of legitimate IPs with relatively lower entropy
than seen for fluxing botnets. The false positives additionally contain failed DNS queries
within the window of analysis (resulting in a correlation value just above the threshold). In
contrast, fluxing botnets usually have a high number of failed domain names within the cor-
responding bin. We observed that the false positives include ISP’s intra-AS DNS resolution
queries where the hosts have been assigned random-appearing domain names.
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4. Correlation vs Number of DNS Failures
Through this experiment, we aim to study the behavior seen for malicious IPs, in terms of
the number of failed domain names generated. Figure 17(b) shows the correlation observed
for malicious and benign IPs. We compute the correlation for three cases where we expect
at least one, two or four failures to occur within the same window, as the cncip. The figure
shows a decrease in correlation, for both benign and legitimate IPs, though the correlation
reduces only slightly for the malicious set. Such a study implies that the correlation criteria
may be adapted towards highly fluxing botnets while reducing false positives.
5. Variation in Entropy
We evaluate the impact of information entropy expressed by the domains which map to
a candidate cncip (that is, SENcncip). The effect of changing the entropy thresholds for
considering a cncip is shown through an ROC curve as in Figure 18. The figure shows
an increase in the detection rate and the false positive rate as the threshold for entropy is
decreased. This is in line with the observation that for a low threshold, several sets of
domain names, and in particular those for CDNs satisfy the filters used for detection. Anal-
ogous to the performance with varying correlation threshold, the maximum false positive
rate observed is 0.52%. Analysis of false positives reveals DNSBL services (redcondor),
popular websites (e.g. sina.com.cn which offer multiple services), DNS and HTTP servers
providing service to multiple entities, blogging services (blogspot) and CDN addresses.
For instance, we observe redcondor IPs labelled malicious when the entropy thresholds are
0.35 or lower, indicating that even though correlation may be high for this DNSBL service,
the entropy helps distinguish it from actual anomalies, when using higher thresholds. In
section E, we discuss how botnets may attempt to fool our detection approach into gen-
erating domains with low entropy. Note that we determine the detection rate over the 12
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Table VII. Impact of changing time bin size on botnet detection
Window size 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
(sec)
ISP trace
FPR (%) 0.022 0.043 0.043 0.097 0.173 0.259 0.302
TPR (%) 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 83.33 83.33
Campus trace
FPR (%) 0.021 0.039 0.084 0.120 0.209 0.434 0.752
TPR (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
detectable botnet IPs, as discussed in section 3.
6. Size of Time Bin
The impact of varying the size of time bins is shown in Table VII. In all experiments,
we observe that false positives increase with larger time bins. The wider bins allow a
higher possibility of inclusion of failures within the corresponding cncip bin, resulting in
an increased Corrcncip value. Thus, more candidate IP addresses meet the criteria set by
filter F2 (in figure 15) and the ones with high entropy may be incorrectly labelled malicious.
From the table, we also observe that smaller window sizes result in fewer IP addresses being
detected within the ISP trace. An inference of this observation is bots can distribute their
DNS queries making temporal correlation between failures and successes difficult. The
false positive rate, however, is less than 0.3% for ISP trace (and 0.75% for campus trace)
for all experiments making the choice of larger windows possible. However, the marginal
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or no increase in detection rate and false positive rate, for the change in window size from
4 secs to 128 secs implies that a window as small as 4 secs may be sufficient for detecting a
domain-fluxing botnet like Conficker. Note that the false positives for the campus trace are
higher when compared to the ISP trace, as we frequently observe DNSBL (used by email
filtering systems) based NXDOMAIN failures within the campus dataset. Such DNSBL
failures affect the correlation/entropy parameters resulting in more benign IPs classified as
malicious.
Dyndns is a service for generating customizable/random temporary domain names.
In the ISP trace, we observe several random sub-domains for dyndns which exhibit high
entropy characteristics, with several failures belonging to this service. Our detection mech-
anism designates these IP addresses as benign owing to presence of temporally distant
failures, reinforcing our hypothesis of utilizing temporal correlation of failed domains for
anomaly detection through the use of small time bins. We also limit our study to a max-
imum bin size of 256 seconds as fast-fluxing botnets have low DNS Time-To-Live (TTL)
values.
E. Discussion
In this work, we detect Conficker C&C addresses which exhibit high entropy owing to ran-
domized distribution of alphanumeric characters composing the domain names. However,
to evade our detection mechanism, botnet owners may alter the way domain names are com-
posed. For instance, the work in the earlier chapter has observed combination of dictionary
words being used as an alternate way of domain-fluxing. Some example domain names
that we observe for a botnet are haireconomy.ru, greedycake.ru and empirekey.ru [70]. The
information entropy computed for a set of such domain names indicates that owing to high
edit distance values, such domain names can still be distinguished through entropy analysis.
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To validate the robustness of our approach, we artificially inject domain queries as
observed above, with some of them failing and some domain names successfully mapping
to a reserved address. We randomly choose clients to insert such DNS queries. Based on
our study, we still detect the simulated anomalies with similar experiment parameters as
used previously for evaluation. Also, in future if botnet owners formulate a DGA where
the observed entropy is lower than that observed for fluxing botnet detected in this work,
our detection mechanism can detect them with low false positives, as hinted by figure 18.
A direct weakness of our detection strategy is reliance on failed domain names. Our
experiments are based on analyzing the first few successful domain names and correlating
failures that are present in their vicinity. In the event that no failures are present, or failures
that occur right after the window of analysis, our detection strategy may fail in which case
switching to the algorithm for correlating failures to supplement the set SQcncip would
help. Thus, a combination of both the strategies presented in this work may be useful
for fast anomaly detection. It is possible to generate DNS queries slowly such that the
failed queries are outside the time window considered in our scheme. Such an approach,
however, will slow down the bot in identifying its C&C server and hence constraining the
botnet writer again.
Our technique for detection can be mapped back to detect individual bots that issued
the queries for a malicious cncip. For instance, with our campus trace analysis, we ob-
serve 12 hosts within our AS querying for three of the four C&C addresses, and 10 hosts
(subset of the 12 above) querying for the remaining C&C address. While the Tier-1 ISP
trace may not have individual clients (we would mostly observe aggregators), the mecha-
nism applied for a smaller-sized network or when applied recursively, may result in more
accurate detection of anomalies and bots, owing to a better DNS failure signal.
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CHAPTER V
INFERENCE MALFEASANCE THROUGH BIG DATA ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Malware infections spread via many vectors such as drive-by downloads, removable drives,
and social engineering. Malicious domain or URL accesses, however, cause a majority of
infections these days [71]. For example, a user may be tricked into clicking malicious links
hidden in iFrames, sent via email, and embedded in advertisements [10, 72]. If infected,
malware installed on hosts may be involved in pilfering sensitive data, spreading infections,
DDoS attacks, and spamming. The stakes are high for enterprise networks due to legal
issues and loss of intellectual property, money, and reputation. Hence to contain malware,
enterprises must identify and isolate infected hosts in their network and prevent the other
hosts from accessing malicious domains.
Reliably identifying infected hosts and malicious domains, however, is challenging.
Modern malware such as rootkits may evade anti-virus products and other host-based anal-
ysis techniques. Similarly, identification via network and communication traffic analysis
is difficult as botnet communication by design tries to mimic that of legitimate applica-
tions [3]. Many enterprises use DNS blacklists to identify and prevent malicious domain
accesses; such lists, however, incur a significant delay in adding new domains as they
rely on many manual and automated sources. Malicious domain inference using DNS and
network properties such as a domain’s IP addresses and BGP prefixes require large data
collection. Hence these techniques may not scale well to large enterprise settings.
In this chapter, we propose a scalable and near-real time approach to detect infected
hosts in an enterprise and malicious domains accessed by the enterprise’s hosts. We first
construct a host-domain access graph by adding edges between every host in the enter-
88
prise and the domains visited by the host. The graph is built using only the DNS based
information, which comprises of only a small subset of the total network traffic. Such a
choice reduces resource requirement. We seed the graph with ground truth information
about a small fraction of nodes from external blacklists and white-lists, i.e., we label a
few nodes as malicious and benign, and label the rest of the nodes as unknown. We then
use belief propagation to estimate an unknown node’s marginal probability of being ma-
licious [73, 74]. A node’s marginal probability is an estimate of the node being malicious
given the state of the graph’s labeled nodes; belief propagation is a fast and approximate
estimation algorithm used in diverse fields such as computer vision and error correcting
codes.
We applied our approach to host-domain graphs generated from two data sets: 760GB
of HTTP proxy logs and DHCP logs collected in a global enterprise’s worldwide locations
and DNS query logs collected from a university. Our results show that with minimal ground
truth information, e.g., 1.42% nodes in a graph, we achieve high true positive rates (TPR)
with low false positive rates (FPR) and low false discovery rates (FDR). A benign node
labeled as malicious by our approach is a false positive. Similarly, FDR is the fraction
of benign domains among the domains labeled malicious by our approach. Low FPR and
FDR are essential in enterprise settings. We also validated our results using well-known
external sources to demonstrate our approach’s robustness.
Our approach scales to large enterprise settings and simultaneously identifies mali-
cious domains without any active interference inside the hosts. Our passive approach relies
on data already collected by enterprises for regulatory compliance and forensic reasons.
Also, unlike “global” DNS blacklists, our approach can be customized to an enterprise by
utilizing the enterprise’s data sets.
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B. The Belief Propagation Algorithm
Marginal probability estimation in context of a graph G = (V,E) with V nodes and
E edges, implies estimating the state of a node based on the probabilistic model of the
states assumed by other graph nodes. The marginal probability estimation problem is NP-
Complete [74]. The belief propagation (BP) algorithm has been proposed as a fast and
approximate solution for computing the marginal probability and has been successfully ap-
plied to various domains such as error-correction, image restoration, social-network based
spam detection, and more.
Given a set of random variables with their respective probability distributions, the
belief propagation technique is used for estimating the marginal probability for a particular
variable [74]. In all of the previously described models, the goal is to infer or estimate a
graph node’s state. To elaborate, given a graph with random variables as nodes, each with
an initial state distribution, and the relationship between nodes defined by a pre-determined
criteria, the BP algorithm helps infer the probability (or the belief ) of a node to be in
a particular state. The belief propagation technique computes the marginal probabilities
based on messages passed between nodes over multiple iterations. The iterations repeat
until the system converges to a stable probability distribution of the states for each node.
The probability of a node i being in a state xi, is referred to as the belief, denoted
by bi(xi). The computation of bi(xi) depends on two factors: (a) the initial probability
estimate for each node to be in a state, and (b) the mutual relationship between states of the
two nodes. The initial probability of a node i to be in a state xi, is called the prior, denoted
by φi(xi). In context of the belief computation for a bipartite graph with hosts and domains
as nodes, the state assumed by every node in the graph can either be malicious or benign.
The initial state distribution, therefore, estimates the node as being in either of the above
two classes. The second key factor required to apply belief propagation is expressed by the
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relationship between two nodes i and j, also called the edge potential. The edge potential
between nodes i and j, represents the probability of j being in a state xj , given that the state
of i is xi, and vice versa. It is denoted by ψij(xi, xj).
In a graphical model with nodes connected to each other through edges, the compu-
tation of a belief is dependent upon the messages passed from one node to the other. A
message from i to j which estimates node i’s perception of node j being in a particular
state (xj), depends on the prior for node i, the edge potential for i and j, and the message
inputs that i obtains from all its neighbors (excluding j). Mathematically, the message is
defined as:
mij(xj) =
∑
xi∈Si
φi(xi)ψij(xi, xj)
∏
k∈N(i)\j
mki(xi) (5.1)
where N(i) represents the neighbors of node i, and Si represents the set of all states
that node i can be in (that is, Si ∈ {benign,malicious}). Each message mij gets updated
over every iteration and the algorithm stops when all messages converge, that is, the mes-
sages do not change significantly over iterations. The messages may be normalized such
that
∑
xi∈Si
mki(xi) = 1. Normalization of messages prevents underflow. In later sections,
we show that additional measures are required to prevent underflow in a well-connected
graph with several nodes having degrees of the order of 10K. Finally, the messages from
the converged (final) iteration are used for computing beliefs through the equation:
bi(xi) = Cφ(xi)
∏
k∈N(i)
mki(xi) (5.2)
where C denotes the normalization constant (that is, ensuring∑xi∈Si bi(xi) = 1). In
our context of malfeasance detection, the belief value such as bi(xi) = 0.6 means that the
node i is malicious with a 60% chance and benign with a 40% chance.
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C. Methodology
In this section, we present our approach used to identify malicious (or benign) hosts and do-
mains by applying the belief propagation technique on a bipartite graph. We also describe
the bipartite graph generation process and justify the choice of parameters used.
1. Data Sets and Ground Truth
To generate the bipartite graph, we use a 26-hour long dataset of HTTP logs collected on
September 29, 2010. The logs are collected from over 300 HTTP proxy servers catering
to more than 300K clients within an enterprise network, with the proxy servers are spread
all across the world. Each HTTP query in the log gives information about which client
IP asked for a URL, the corresponding URL’s domain, the time at which the query was
made, the HTTP header etc. Every query in an HTTP log also gives us information about
the status of the HTTP request made by a client. For instance, the requested URL could
be served from the proxy’s cache, fetched from the Internet, or the URL retrieval could
also fail. In addition to the HTTP logs, we collect DHCP logs from six DHCP servers
responsible for the 300K+ hosts. The DHCP logs were collected over five days before and
including Sep 29, 2010. Each DHCP log identifies the duration for which an IP address is
assigned to a physical host, which we correlate for an accurate host
 domain association.
We also use a week long (August 22-29, 2010) DNS trace captured at a recursive DNS
resolver of a university campus. The recursive resolver serves approximately 7.9K hosts
within the university. Due to absence of the corresponding DHCP logs, the bipartite graph
for the campus dataset thus contains client IP addresses as host nodes and the domains they
query, as the domain nodes.
To establish the ground truth before applying the algorithm, we use a proprietary
blacklist of domains, another proprietary blacklist of IPs, and the publicly available Alexa
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malicious.com
unknown.com
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Fig. 19. Sample Host
 Domain bipartite graph containing nodes with a blacklisted (mali-
cious.com), a white-listed (benign.com), and an unknown (unknown.com) domain.
white-list [75]. The domain blacklist contains approximately 658K fully qualified domain
names (FQDNs, that is, not just sub-domains). The IP blacklist contains about 1.32M IP
addresses. Both blacklists have been accumulated at around the same time as the logs.
From the Alexa white-list, we use the top 5000 of the one million domains sorted by popu-
larity. A conservative choice of only 5000 domains allows a greater confidence in assigning
priors to domains in the dataset.
2. Overview
We apply the belief propagation algorithm to a bipartite graph consisting of a unique set of
hosts and a unique set of domains accessed by those hosts. One such sample graph is shown
in Figure 19 where a client within the network under analysis, identified asHost1, accesses
three domains viz. malicious.com, unknown.com, and benign.com. The order in which the
domains are accessed is irrelevant. Similarly, client Host2 accesses two domains, both
of which are common with those accessed by Host1. Thus, our problem may be posed as
determining the reputation of the unknown domain unknown.com or that of the hosts, based
on the known information about domains.
The actual graph generated from the HTTP-proxy and DHCP dataset is much larger,
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with approximately 2M nodes and 12M edges, and with the ground truth available only for
approximately 20K nodes. We describe the enterprise network bipartite graph generation
procedure with greater detail in section 3. Once the bipartite graph is generated, we assign
priors and choose appropriate edge potentials before we apply belief propagation to com-
pute the reputation of each node (hosts or domain) in the graph. The reputation is inferred
through message passing as described in section B. In section 4, we describe the choice
of priors and edge potentials specific to our problem. We also highlight the non-trivial
assumptions for application of BP to a large graph as encountered for our analysis. The
reputation of each node, which is the marginal probability estimated through BP, is subse-
quently used for labelling the node as either malicious or benign. System administrators
may thus choose the domain designations to supplement intra-AS blacklists, white-lists, or
access control lists (ACLs), thereby curbing the spread of infection within the AS, or utilize
host designations for patching infected machines.
3. Composing the Bipartite Graph
The bipartite graph of hosts and domains for an autonomous system represents the domains
accessed by hosts. This relationship is expressed through an edge from a host node to a
domain node in the graph. Such a graph may have overlaps between different hosts or do-
mains. That is, multiple hosts may access the same domain, in addition to a host accessing
multiple domains. The reader may note that with regard to BP, the belief computation is
dependent on the messages traversing graph edges, and therefore the beliefs are influenced
by the graph structure.
Each HTTP log from our dataset identifies the URLs accessed by a client (represented
through an IP address). For our problem, we analyze only the domain in the URL. Recog-
nizing IP address churns due to dynamic addressing, we also use the DHCP logs for accu-
rate association of a host with a domain. The DHCP logs help us identify all IP address(es)
94
bound to each client over the duration of analysis, through unique records associating the
48-bit hardware (MAC) address of the network interface, with an IP address, at a particular
time instant. Thus, all host nodes in a bipartite graph represent unique network interfaces.
To accomplish graph generation, we determine the temporal intersection of two types
of bindings: (a) From HTTP-proxy logs: what domains does an IP address access?, and (b)
From DHCP logs: what IP address(es) got associated with a MAC address? The resulting
bipartite graph yields 141K hosts (or MAC addresses) and approximately 1.3M domains.
The graph also contains approximately 12M undirected edges where each edge joins a host
to a domain. The degree distribution gives us an indication of the feasibility for a mes-
sage to traverse the length of the graph. In context of applying BP for anomaly detection,
the base message which carries the known (or ground truth) information, should propagate
across the whole graph. A well-connected bipartite graph thus ensures that such base mes-
sages travel farther helping in an accurate analysis. In section e, we discuss the possibility
of excessive information propagation leading to noise.
Note that the nodes representing the unknown domains in the bipartite graph repre-
sent unique second-level domains. Considering only the second-level domains improves
the degree distribution of domain nodes, increasing the probability of existence of a path
between two nodes in the graph. Such a choice is also motivated by the assumption that
usually second-level domains are responsible for (mis)happenings within their domain or
sub-domains. Thus, our approach may designate a domain example.com as malicious, even
though only a sub-domain badsite.sub.example.com is actually involved in malicious ac-
tivities. It is also worth noting that a domain node may also represent a web server IPv4
address that we obtain from the HTTP-proxy logs. In this case, we represent the complete
IPv4 address as a node in the bipartite graph. We ignore illegitimate domain names (with no
TLDs) and retrieve the second-level domains from complete domain names using Google’s
Guava library for Java [76].
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Fig. 20. Flow chart for reputation inference.
4. Anomaly Detection with BP
Figure 20 illustrates the components of our algorithm. After generating the bipartite graph
as described in section 3, each node is assigned a prior (probability of being malicious).
We use a proprietary domain blacklist to assign a prior of 0.99 (most used value) to a node
with its corresponding domain (or IP) in the blacklist. We use a publicly available white-
list [75] to assign a prior of 0.01 to domain nodes representing domains in the white-list.
Note that we use only the top 5000 domains from the white-list. From the lists, we find that
approximately 16K domains are in the blacklists and about 4.5K domains are in the white-
list. Thus, the a priori information for our algorithm is very small and comprises of only
1.42% of the total graph nodes. Note that our dataset does not contain any information
about host nodes being infected. Therefore, we assign a prior of 0.5 to all host nodes
implying that the probability of a host node being malicious is 0.5 (which is same as that
of being benign).
After prior assignment to graph nodes, we apply the iterative belief propagation algo-
rithm. In every iteration, the algorithm passes messages over all the directed edges, where
a message is computed from equation (5.1). The message computation also depends on the
choice of an edge potential matrix. One such sample matrix is present in Table VIII.
From the table we infer the following about the relationship between two graph nodes.
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Table VIII. A sample edge potential
matrix (ψ1)
@
@
@
@
@
xi
xj
Benign Malicious
Benign 0.51 0.49
Malicious 0.49 0.51
Table IX. Another edge potential
matrix (ψ2)
@
@
@
@
@
xi
xj
Benign Malicious
Benign 0.75 0.25
Malicious 0.49 0.51
Given a host, if it is assumed to be benign, we consider the domain it accesses (represented
as a graph edge) to be benign with a probability of 0.51. This follows the general intuition
of associating goodness together, akin to a social network. Similarly, if a host is assumed
to be malicious, then there is a greater (51%) chance that the domain it accesses is mali-
cious. The relationship holds even in the alternate case where the inference over a host is
based on the state of the domain. Thus, the edge potential matrix symmetrically estimates
the state of a domain, given a host, and vice versa. For the curious reader, we note that
using asymmetric edge potential results in final beliefs oscillating between two equilibrium
values. The asymmetric edge potential here implies, for instance, that given a malicious
host, the probability of domain being malicious is different from the probability of the host
being malicious when it accesses a malicious domain. As a result, the beliefs obtained with
an asymmetric ψ, are inconclusive as the messages obtained in odd iterations are distinctly
different from the messages in even iterations, and therefore not considered further in this
work.
The belief propagation technique has been applied to graphical models where nodes
are usually associated with a small degree, such as for image restoration or error correction.
However, for a model like ours where domain nodes may be contacted by thousands of
hosts or a host node can access several domains, the computation of messages becomes
non-trivial. Specifically, since an outgoing message from a node is dependent on messages
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sent from its neighbors, equation (5.1) for a large number of neighbors leads to underflow.
Thus, corresponding beliefs computed also suffer from underflow during computation. To
counter the problem of underflow, we use Java’s BigDecimal data type for storing extremely
small decimal values, in addition to normalizing messages. Note that the conventional data
types such as float and double are not sufficient.
The algorithm iterates over all edges until the messages converge. A converged mes-
sage mij(xj) outlines node i’s estimate of node j being in a state xj , and that estimate
reaches an equilibrium which does not change considerably over time. Once the messages
have converged, the beliefs are computed using equation (5.2). The beliefs, when normal-
ized, indicate the relative reputation of nodes. Note that the belief values vary from 0.0 to
1.0. Thus, based on an appropriate choice of a threshold, we designate the node with belief
value greater than or equal to the threshold as malicious, and benign otherwise.
D. Evaluation
We now present our evaluation over the HTTP-proxy logs and the campus DNS dataset
described earlier. To apply the belief propagation algorithm on our huge dataset, we use
a 12-core 2.8 GHz machine with 48 GB of RAM. In another setup, we utilize a 48-core
2.3 GHz and 128 GB RAM, assisted with multi-threaded message computation. A typical
experiment with 24M directed edges as in our graph, consumes approximately 25 GB of
memory. Our implementation is in Java.
1. Analyzing HTTP Dataset
a. Performance
We evaluate the performance of our approach by examining the ROC curves for detection
rate and false positive rates which are computed using theK-fold cross validation technique
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with K as 10. For K-fold cross validation, we divide the ground truth into K distinct parts.
We then use K - 1 parts as seeds for applying belief propagation, and validate the labels
assigned by our approach to the remaining part. Unless otherwise stated, we use a 10-
fold cross validation for our analysis. Figure 21(a) shows the quality of identifying the
malicious and benign domains correctly, for one (of 10) segment(s). The initial iteration
is in blue while the final iterations are in red color. The curve shows detection improving
with every iteration with the increasing area under ROC curve. Note that the bigger the
area under an ROC curve, the better the performance.
We observe that for the converging iteration, we obtain a detection rate (TPR) of ap-
proximately 80% with a 7% false positive rate (FPR). We note that for large networks, our
tool may result in raising too many false alarms. This can be countered by delegating the
analysis of the tool to subnets within the larger network, making analysis feasible. In later
section, we show that the performance can be further improved using zone-based evalua-
tion where we obtain the same detection rate for an FPR less than 1%. From the figure,
we also observe the false discovery rate (FDR) to be between 2-5% for a false positive
rate less than 10%. Note that the false discovery rate measures the expected proportion of
false positives among all significant hypotheses. The relatively poor performance for initial
iterations can be attributed to messages which do not traverse the path long enough, thus
prohibiting propagation of correct state estimates embedded in base messages (as defined
previously). This affects the computation of beliefs and hence the performance.
b. Sensitivity to Priors
For Unknown Entities: In previous experiments, we use 0.5 as the prior for nodes for
which there is no initial evidence of being malicious or benign. The prior of 0.5, however,
does not influence the outgoing messages based on incoming information (equation (5.1)).
Therefore, for unknown domain or host nodes, we experiment with priors derived from the
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Fig. 21. (a) ROC curve for a typical experiment with priors for unknown nodes as 0.5, and
the edge potential as in Table VIII. Initial iterations are in blue while the converging
iteration is in red. The straight line is the 0th iteration (no reputations assigned).
(b) ROC comparing the performance of using constant priors vs. sigmoid priors.
Performance with constant prior is similar to sigmoid, but takes twice as many
iterations.
corresponding node’s characteristics. One such function that we use for assigning priors is
the sigmoid function, as given by the following equation:
f(x) =
1
1 + e
−(x−k)
W
where, 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ 1 (5.3)
where f(x) = 0.5 when x = k. W , the sigmoid width, is a parameter which defines
the slope or the rate of increase or decrease of f(x). Note that the sigmoid function can
be monotonically increasing or decreasing depending upon the coefficient for (x − k) in
equation (5.3). If the coefficient is negative (as in equation (5.3)), f(x) is monotonically
increasing and decreasing otherwise.
To assign priors for unknown host nodes, we choose an increasing sigmoid function,
where the prior is a function of the number of HTTP requests made by a host. We as-
sume that a large number of HTTP requests indicates higher maliciousness as malware
may repeatedly communicate with the rogue master for various activities (section A). For
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this experiment, the parameter k for the host prior function is 6219, which is the average
number of HTTP requests made by host nodes in the bipartite graph.
Similarly, we choose a decreasing sigmoid function for unknown domain nodes where
the function varies with degree of the node. A node with large degree indicates high pop-
ularity (e.g. facebook.com), and thus the function assigns a low prior to the node. The
average domain degree (k in equation (5.1)) comes out to be nine. Note that we compute
W such that f(x) is in the range [0.01, 0.99].
Figure 21(b) presents the performance with sigmoid priors. We observe that the orig-
inal choice of constant priors performs marginally better for lower false positive rates. For
instance, for a false positive rate of 6%, we note the true positive rate increasing from 73%
to 80%. However, the number of iterations (or the time taken) to converge to final belief
values is almost half for sigmoid based priors. The lower latency is attributed to speedier
transition of messages across the edges due to a relatively biased (6= 0.5) prior.
c. Sensitivity to Edge Potentials
For graphical models with high degree, the message value is sensitive to the choice of
edge potential matrix. For high degree nodes, the outgoing message converges to spe-
cific elements of the edge potential matrix. This behavior is recognizable from equation
(5.1). Therefore, an appropriate choice of the edge potentials is critical, especially for large
graphs.
The performance with the edge potential from Table VIII has been shown in Figure
21(a). We experiment with another matrix as shown in Table IX. In this table, we assume
a prevalence of beneficence and thus assign a relatively lower probability to spread of mal-
ware. While the performance (in terms of detection rates and corresponding false positive
rates) with the new edge potential matrix is almost the same as that for the edge potentials
of Table VIII, we observe two significant differences. First, we observe that the conver-
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gence rate for the new edge potentials, is three times faster than that for the edge potential
from Table VIII. The second observation is that the performance even for initial iterations,
is very close to that for converging iterations (influencing faster convergence). We attribute
these advantages to the edge potential values which reflect the probability estimates be-
tween nodes better than Table VIII. Consequently, the beliefs computed from the first few
iterations can be utilized for assessing a host or a domain, giving us a 10-20 times latency
reduction by an order of magnitude compared to our original setup.
d. Analysis of Labelled Domains
We now evaluate the labels assigned by our technique to the unknown domain nodes in
the bipartite graph. To accomplish unknown domain node verification, we use three pub-
lic sources for determining domain (or IP address) reputation viz. Web of Trust (WoT),
McAfee TrustedSource, and Robtex. The WoT assigns numerical reputation and confidence
scores (0-100) for four categories, namely, Trustworthiness, Vendor reliability, Privacy, and
Child Safety. We use scores only from the Trustworthiness category. TrustedSource’s eval-
uation of a queried domain or IP address, is relatively more generic as it only assigns cat-
egorical labels such as High/Medium/Unverified/Minimal risk. Robtex is a multipurpose
web-based tool which checks the queried subject against hundreds of DNSBL services.
Automated validation: First, we use the WoT API to check 2000 domain nodes with
the highest and the lowest belief values each. The domain nodes with top 2000 belief values
(denoted by maldom-list) represent what our technique considers the most malicious, while
the bottom 2000 are considered to be most benign (the bendom-list). The beliefs are com-
puted with the edge potential as in Table VIII, the known node priors being 0.99 or 0.01,
and the unknown node prior assigned using a sigmoid function. When checked against the
WoT API we find that only 12.3% of the domains in the maldom-list are present in the
WoT database. On the contrary, 65.1% domains from bendom-list have a score from WoT.
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Table X. Distribution of domains from designated malicious and benign lists into various
categories. We consider only the ones with high confidence (≥ 23).
Category (Score range)
Maldom-list Bendom-list
fraction (%) fraction (%)
Excellent (80-100) 0.4 25.0
Good (60-79) 0.05 3.0
Unsatisfactory (40-59) 0 1.7
Poor (20-39) 0.05 1.3
Very Poor (0-19) 0 1.95
Total 0.3 21.98
Note that the lag between the actual dataset and external validation as described here, is ap-
proximately 11 months. Thus, we infer that the maldom-list primarily consists of volatile
domains, a prominent feature of malware or domain-fluxing botnets [61] [62] [77]. Of the
domains in the two lists with scores present, we look for the ones with good reputation
(≥ 60) and high confidence (≥ 23). We find that only 0.45% domains from maldom-list
and 28.0% domains from the bendom-list satisfy the criteria above. Table X categorizes
the domains in the two lists based on their reputation scores. Note that we present the
distribution only for the scores which have a corresponding high confidence which is a
conservative estimate. Further sections reveal our evaluation of both benign and malicious
labelled domains using another source and different levels of malfeasance (or beneficence)
tests.
Manual validation: From the domains which do not have scores in the WoT database,
we choose 100 domains randomly from each list and validate them by checking against
TrustedSource and Robtex. We consider domains as malicious only if they belong to High
risk category (TrustedSource) or are present in at least two1 of the blacklists (checked by
Robtex). Similarly, to identify benignness, we look for domains categorized as “Minimal
Risk” and not present in any of the blacklists checked by Robtex. Tables XI and XII sum-
marize our analysis.
1We choose this threshold heuristically. Later, we highlight 8 as a reliable threshold.
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Table XI. Manual validation of 100 random domains (with absent WoT scores) from the
maldom list.hhhhhhhhhhhhTrustedSource
Robtex
≥ 0 BL ≥ 1 BL ≥ 2 BLs ≥ 4 BLs ≥ 8 BLs
High risk 51% 47% 47% 42% 17%
Unverifi ed risk 25% 11% 10% 7% 0%
Minimal risk 22% 1% 1% 1% 0%
Table XII. Manual validation of 100 random domains (with absent WoT scores) from the
bendom list.hhhhhhhhhhhhTrustedSource
Robtex
≥ 0 BL ≥ 1 BL ≥ 2 BLs ≥ 4 BLs ≥ 8 BLs
High risk 2% 1% 1% 0% 0%
Unverifi ed risk 11% 2% 1% 1% 0%
Minimal risk 87% 6% 0% 0% 0%
From the table, we observe that 60%(15) of the malicious-labelled domains are found
in at least two of the DNSBLs checked by Robtex while for bendom-list, this fraction is
20% (five) of the 25 random domains. We later show how we improve the labelling by
qualitatively using labels as ground truth for further prediction.
e. Impact of Graph Modification
In previous sections, we note the impact of parameters directly affecting the belief propa-
gation algorithm. Here we present another aspect which is to study the effect of modifying
the graph structure, on the performance of our approach. The belief messages containing
probabilistic reputation scores, traverse the edges in graph. The convergence parameters
identify the spread of such messages, in essence limiting the number of hops the messages
can make. Thus, a highly connected graph allows noise to travel farther than it should.
To better explain the scenario, let us take an example. Assuming a host is infected with
malware, visits a malicious domain in addition to several benign and unknown domains.
In an attempt to identify another malicious domain, the propagation of malicious messages
will get overwhelmed by the benign messages leading to a false negative and therefore
hurting performance. To constrain the scope of such noise, we modify the graph reducing
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Fig. 22. Analyzing the separation of labelled domains.
the number of propagation paths.
Path removal in our context translates to removing edges. The maximum impact is
thus realized by removing nodes from the graph with the highest degrees. Therefore, to
understand the impact of curbed noise, we remove 500 unknown domain nodes with the
highest degrees. As a result, there is a 52.13% reduction in the number of edges, from
11.85M to 5.67M undirected edges. As a result, using default values for remaining param-
eters, we observe a minor improvement in performance. More specifically, we observe that
for false positive rates ranging from 10-20%, the detection rates improve to 2-3% confirm-
ing our hypothesis of presence of noise and the subsequent alleviation. For larger networks,
the gains obtained due to such a modification can be significant, especially when our tool
is used at the edge of the large network.
f. Qualitative Analysis of Assigned Labels
The reputation score or the final belief value represents the confidence of our algorithm in
designating a node as benign or malicious. For instance, a benign test domain is expected
to have a lower belief value (tending to zero) while a malicious test domain’s reputation
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score would be close to one. We now study the quality of this score assignment.
To assess the designated labels, we split the final belief values into three regions or
bands, symmetric about the mid-point of range of final beliefs. The uppermost band con-
sists of domains with highest beliefs and therefore labelled malicious by our algorithm
(malRegion). Similarly, the lower most region represents domains labelled benign (benRe-
gion). We do not, however, assign labels to nodes in the central region. Thus, the central
region represents a low confidence zone which may not represent the true state of test nodes
and through demarcation of such a zone, we intend to make fewer classification mistakes.
Figure 22 highlights such an evaluation. A false positive in this scenario is a benign node
present in only the malRegion while malicious nodes falling in the benRegion are false
negatives.
Upon linearly expanding the central region about the mid-point, we obtain a perfor-
mance as shown in figure 22. We note a significant improvement when avoiding to classify
domains with beliefs in the low-confidence zone. For instance, at a false positive rate of
approximately 5%, we note the detection rate improved by 18% (from 70% to 88%), while
at the approximately 10% false positive rate, this increase is 11%. Hence, given a wide
central region, a system administrator could conservatively choose to populate the local
domain blacklist and white-list with domains only from the narrow malRegion and ben-
Region respectively tolerating malware infections while avoiding to unnecessarily patch
(thus, disrupt) clean machines (false positives). An aggressive approach, however, would
use narrow central bands in an attempt to find future infections.
2. Analyzing Campus DNS Dataset
To understand the implications of our approach in a different environment, we also apply
our technique to a university campus DNS dataset. Thus, we observe the DNS queries made
by the hosts and the resolver’s replies. The DNS replies may either be satisfied from the
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Fig. 23. Performance comparison of our approach on different datasets.
resolver’s cache or obtained iteratively by querying the respective name servers. To build
the new bipartite graph, we consider only the queries observed within the autonomous
system, that is, those that flow between the hosts and the recursive DNS resolver.
The bipartite graph thus generated has 281K nodes with 1.27M undirected edges.
Of the 281K nodes, 7.7K represent hosts with our network making DNS queries to one
specific recursive resolver. The remaining nodes represent unique domains queried over
the week long period. The ground truth utilizing the same blacklist and white-list (as
for HTTP-proxy dataset) results in 5.2K domains labelled malicious and 3.8K domains
labelled benign. Figure 23 compares the results from the BP algorithm on the campus
data set, using the default parameters, against the HTTP dataset. The inferior performance
for the campus dataset is attributed to lack of information due to limited time of capture
and relatively small network size. We believe that the week long capture for the small
network, results in a graph with many edges absent as compared to a dataset captured
over a longer time period which expresses a wider variety of domains a user accesses.
Therefore, the correct information in the form of beliefs does not propagate to the analyzed
nodes, resulting in an inferior performance. In comparison, the HTTP-proxy dataset is
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Fig. 24. Reinforcing ground truth with labelled domains. This figure measures the perfor-
mance when adding domains qualitatively.
only a day long, but represents the behavior of more than 144K hosts. Therefore, a sound
approach would evaluate the algorithm against a dataset which represents a variety of hosts
in addition to being collected over a longer period of time. Such a dataset may be obtained
at a Tier-1 ISP. The computational complexity, however, increases with increasing graph
connections.
E. Reinforcing Detection via Qualitative Learning
We modify our technique to improve detection by adding to the ground truth, those domains
labelled benign or malicious by our algorithm. Figure 20, the flowchart for reputation in-
ference, shows the feedback mechanism incorporated to use labelled domains for future
classification. An iteratively improving ground truth is useful for many reasons. For in-
stance, domain fluxing botnets regularly change domain names that map to the Command
and Control (C&C) server. An iterative learning technique such as ours would help de-
tect the new set of malicious domains by virtue of bots contacting the same server (or IP
address) over time. Therefore, the knowledge of malicious domains from the previous set
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Fig. 25. (a) Qualitative comparison of labelled domains for ground truth updates with 100
and 1000 domains. (b) Randomly chosen domains with high/low degrees are com-
pared with domains classified by our technique.
could now be used for identification of the new set of fluxing domains and possibly new
bots.
To obtain the benefits of repeated ground truth updates, it is essential to ensure that the
newly added knowledge is qualitatively superior. The reputation scores help us decide the
qualitative aspect. We, therefore, use X number of most malicious and benign domains for
addition to ground truth. An excessively large X may create noise while an extremely small
X may not offer enough information. To understand these implications, we experiment with
X as 100, 500, and 1000. That is, for X = 500, we add 500 of the most malicious and benign
domains (ordered by belief values) to the ground truth and evaluate our mechanism again
with a 10-fold cross validation.
The ROC plot in Figure 24 shows the advantages of iterative addition. First, we ob-
serve that adding labelled domains from ground truth considerably improves the perfor-
mance. For instance, at a false positive rate of 10%, we note that for X = 100, there is
about 4% improvement in detection rate when compared to a static ground truth. Also, this
improvement over X = 1000 is about 3%. We note that the gain when adding 500 of the
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most benign/malicious domains is not too different from X = 100. For even smaller values
of X, we expect the performance to degrade, converging towards using only a static ground
truth.
In addition to the ROC based evaluation, we analyze the newly labelled domains by
validating their reputation against external source such as Robtex. Note that the newly
labelled domains are not part of the ground truth, but are obtained as a result of applying
BP on the graph and retrieving most benign/malicious domain. Using a Java API [78], we
automatically collect information about domains or IPs classified by our technique, for each
of the two experiments where X is 100 and 1000. From the two experiments, we obtain 209
(out of 1000) domains labelled malicious, which are unique to each scenario. Similarly, the
count for benign-classified domains is 100. Therefore, we collect Robtex information for
unique domains only.
Figure 25(a) summarizes the qualitative distinction. The top histogram plot represents
fraction of domains (out of 209) which are present in at least 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 blacklists. As
the figure shows, the malicious domains obtained for X = 100 experiment are consistently
greater in different blacklists than for X = 1000. This is especially true for a blacklist
threshold of 8 and 16 which we consider reliable cutoffs for validation. Specifically, for 8
as the blacklist threshold, there are two times as many malicious domains for X = 100 than
for X = 1000. This ratio is almost four times for 16 as the minimum number of blacklists.
For benign labelled domains, we note no domains present in at least 8 or 16 blacklists,
unlike for a blacklist threshold of 4. On analyzing the exceptions in the benign list of
domains for the blacklist threshold of 4, we note that there are 9 IPs for X = 100, all present
in a /20 subnet.
Interestingly, our evaluation of malicious and benign domains reveals a distinct pat-
tern based on the degree of the classified domain. To elaborate, we observe that the benign
domains have high degrees while the malicious domains mostly have lower degrees. To
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validate that our approach is not a manifestation of a simple degree based classification,
we analyze two sets of randomly chosen high degree and low degree domains present in
the bipartite graph. The degree range for the two sets is same as that observed for the do-
mains classified as benign/malicious with our technique. For every domain in the two sets,
each with 250 randomly chosen domains, we again use Robtex to determine the number of
blacklists that the domain is present in. Figure 25(b) highlights that the belief propagation
algorithm identifies a greater fraction of domains correctly. Specifically, with a blacklist
threshold of eight, we observe that our technique helps find twice as many domains when
compared to a degree-based classifier. Similarly for benign domains (that is, high degree
domains from the random set), both techniques do not have any false positives with 8 as
the blacklist threshold.
Thus, reinforcing the propagation of beliefs through qualitative addition of new infor-
mation, amounts to speeding up the detection mechanism as the classified domains can now
be used as an additional source of information. The reinforced mechanism can therefore be
adapted for online detection or integrated into early-warning systems where new domains
or IPs can be used as hints for future infection vectors, enabling pre-emptive action. The
reinforced learning is likely to offer significant benefit when the ground truth is small, as
gained information from the BP algorithm can be a significant boost to the ground truth.
F. Discussion
Our bipartite graph is composed of domain nodes which represent second-level domains.
Thus using belief propagation, we label the second-level domain and consequently all its
sub-domains as malicious or benign. However, such an approach can mis-classify le-
gitimate websites hosted by Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or blogger hosts, in
a scenario where a few hosted websites are actually malicious. For instance, a blog-
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ging host server such as blogexample.com can get labelled as malicious due to a rogue
sub-domain such as maliciousblog.blogexample.com, although the CDN also hosts be-
nignblog1.blogexample.com, benignblog2.blogexample.com etc. First, we note that CDNs
are usually careful of what content is being hosted on their servers. However, instead
of delegating responsibility to the CDN authority, we may instead use white-list or alter-
natively apply metrics which identify CDNs, deferring the computation of reputation for
such groups. Alternatively, we can employ a demarcation technique such that only “high
enough” beliefs are labelled as malicious, or benign if the computed belief is considerably
small. The ones in between need not be labelled (as done with zone-based analysis). An-
other alternative is to use a mix of second-level and third-level domain nodes in the bipartite
graph (assuming the availability of corresponding ground truth).
From our analysis we note that our graph is composed of nodes, some of which have a
high degree. Also, due to relative prevalence of benign nodes compared to malicious nodes,
the belief for a high degree node can get swayed such that the node is labelled as benign.
The key here is to choose the correct parameters which best represents the present context.
Also, the parameters (prior and the edge potential) applicable to our dataset’s bipartite
graph, may not be applicable to another graph or the same graph over time. Therefore, in
addition to using general parameters for the whole graph, one can also split a bipartite graph
into connected components (smaller bipartite graphs) and choose parameters corresponding
to each connected component, increasing performance robustness.
The computation of beliefs using belief propagation and message passing over the
bipartite graph with a large number of edges consumes a considerable amount of time.
However, as messages may not traverse from one connected component to the other (due
to absence of a connecting edge), we may apply belief propagation to individual connected
components only to reduce the latency of label inference for a graph node. We also note
that in an attempt to defeat our inference approach, an attacker can segregate its bots (in-
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fected slave hosts) so that there is no path, limiting the inference due to restricted flow of
information. However, this seriously curbs the functionality and flexibility of the master
(or botnet owner).
In the previous sections, we highlight that excessive paths can result in undesired prop-
agation of noise through the bipartite graph. While removing edges is a possible solution
to curbing noise, alternatively we tried to slow the propagation by modifying messages.
Specifically, we use square and cube rooted substitutes for the original message in our
analysis. Such messages are less influenced by node degrees (high degree nodes have very
small messages) and reduce the impact of noise. This experiment, however, improves per-
formance only for high false positive rates rendering this alteration useless. We believe that
the degradation occurs due to slowing down of the correct informational messages.
G. Related Work
Domain analysis: Determination of a domain’s reputation has been studied extensively.
The authors in [8] predict a domain’s reputation based on network-based, zone-based and
evidence-related features and thus requires a considerable effort in establishing the ground
truth. In addition, they use both supervised and unsupervised heuristics to designate do-
mains with reputation score. Feature extraction from DNS traffic and classification of
URLs has been used in [79] which again uses machine learning techniques for malicious
domain identification. The attributes require external collection of a test domain’s IP ad-
dress and TTL information, thereby increasing resource requirement. [61] explores the
entropy present in a group of domains where domain fluxing botnets are characterized by
higher entropy. Their analysis, however, requires a larger set of domains (more than 100)
for reliable detection. Also, the authors in [61] focus on second-level domain, an IP or
connected component (of IP and domain) detection, while our approach is used to identify
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individual domains and can be extended for characterizing URLs. More recently, authors
in [80] highlight how cached malicious domains do not disrupt botnet functioning in spite
of the malicious domains removed from their TLD hosts.
URL analysis: Ma et al. [81] classify websites based on URL characteristics. Their
approach, however, relies on aggregating additional information such as host IP and ge-
ographical properties (as noted for [8]. Similarly, [82] classifies spam URLs again using
supervised learning algorithms derived from features which use web browser behavior,
DNS, and the corresponding IP information. Alphanumeric character distributions for dis-
tinguishing legitimate from phishing URLs, has been studied in [37]. Another approach
explores generating spamming botnet signatures by analyzing a corpus of spam URLs [42].
The technique generates regular expressions identifying a particular campaign and there-
fore correlating fluxing botnets is difficult for this technique.
Host analysis: Malware and bot detection within an autonomous system has seen
a significant interest. For instance, authors in [2] analyze the network traffic looking for
abnormal crowd density (in a set of network flows) and crow homogeneity (similarity in
response messages) for identifying the C&C server and the bots within the network. Simi-
larly, [66] looks at the correlation between malign activities that result in infection. Specifi-
cally, the series of events such as egg download, contact with the C&C, and the subsequent
attack are used as indicators of anomaly. Note that these approaches require raw network
data analysis affecting scalability. The technique in [83], however, looks only at a specific
malicious seed set, identifying patterns and consequently the infected hosts which match
those patterns. The success of this approach relies on a comprehensive seed pool set. Be-
havior of known infected hosts has also been studied in [84] where a malware is subjected
to alternate network responses in an attempt to understand its behavior and thus use new
information for predicting future attacks.
Graph analysis: Graph analysis for anomaly detection has been studied in [62]. The
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authors in [62] analyze the graph structure for hosts and failed DNS queries and highlight
tight clusters as indicators of an anomaly. [85] produces blacklists of attack sources by
performing a link analysis. The relationship defined by links provides relevance of attack
sources to networks. Coupled with the attack severity as inputs, the algorithm outputs the
rank assigned to an attack source in a blacklist. Correlation of temporal and entropy-based
features of DNS failures for botnet based C&C (domain/IP) detection, has been studied
in [77]. Although we do not utilize DNS failures, our approach may be leveraged by such
failures leading to a bigger set of a priori information.
Belief propagation has previously been used for anomaly detection. [86] uses the BP
technique for detecting only the infected hosts within the network by applying the infer-
ence over a bipartite graph of hosts and resident files. Inference for multi-class problems
using belief propagation such as that for Twitter, has been studied in [87]. Inference over
hyper links between web pages for determining the “importance”, is done using the PageR-
ank algorithm [88]. TrustRank, on the other hand, determines spam pages by propagating
trust over the web-graph. The belief propagation algorithm is similar to the PageRank as
both look for quality of the inbound links, to identify the reputation of a given page. The
belief propagation algorithm, however, computes the marginal probability in contrast to
PageRank which only propagates a single state information along the graph edges. Note
that TrustRank follows a procedure similar to that of PageRank. [89] detects P2P based
bots by analyzing mixing rates for random walks over the graph topology. With respect
to applying belief propagation, the authors in [90] provide useful insights for choosing the
key parameters for the algorithm.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we present several scalable techniques for anomaly detection. First, we pro-
pose using the DNS traffic for identifying a wide variety of anomalies. The use of DNS
is motivated by DNS traffic comprising only about 2% of the total network traffic. We
then demonstrate MiND, a tool for detecting misdirected DNS packets occurring within
an autonomous system, due to a poisoned resolver cache or due to malware induced host
modification. The MiND system comprises of the DNS query verifier, which identifies
anomalies utilizing a continuously updating database containing authoritative name server
information. Our results indicate that we are able to detect all misdirected packets. Our
analysis results in a false positive rate of less than 0.8%, which can be further reduced to
0.046% by autonomous system checks. As a future work, we plan to analyze the incoming
DNS response packets to detect and thwart poisoning attempts directed towards a recursive
DNS resolver. We also plan to the evaluate the effect of using BGP prefix information, with
different prefixes for DNS packet validation.
We also propose a methodology for detecting algorithmically generated domain names
as used for “domain fluxing” by several recent Botnets. We propose statistical measures
such as Kullback-Leibler divergence, Jaccard index, and Levenshtein edit distance for clas-
sifying a group of domains as malicious (algorithmically generated) or not. We perform
a comprehensive analysis on several data sets including a set of legitimate domain names
obtained via a crawl of IPv4 address space as well as DNS traffic from a Tier-1 ISP in Asia.
One of our key contributions is the relative performance characterization of each metric
in different scenarios. In general, the Jaccard measure performs the best, followed by the
Edit distance measure, and finally the K-L divergence. Furthermore, we show how our
methodology when applied to the Tier-1 ISP’s trace was able to detect Conficker as well
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as a botnet yet unknown and unclassified, which we call as Mjuyh. In this regards, our
methodology can be used as a first alarm to indicate the presence of domain fluxing in a
network, and thereafter a network security analyst can perform additional forensics to infer
the exact algorithm being used to generate the domain names. As future work, we plan to
generalize our metrics to work on n-gram for values of n > 2.
We extend the previous technique utilizing failed domain names in the quest for rapid
detection of a fluxing botnet’s C&C server, the bots within the local network, and the related
domain names, and thus revealing the botnet infrastructure. Utilizing only DNS traffic, we
reduce the resource requirement for botnet detection. We also considerably reduce the
latency of detection when compared to previous techniques. For faster detection, we utilize
not only the entropy of the domain names successfully mapping to an IP address, but also
that of the correlated failed DNS queries occurring within the vicinity of the succeeding
DNS query. With our technique, we achieve a false positive rate as low as 0.02% with a
high detection rate. As a future work, we plan to utilize SERVER FAILURE based DNS
failures, or failures related to the name servers, as a means for detecting botnets which
exhibit double fast flux.
We propose another technique to scale network analysis further. We present a tech-
nique to check malfeasance by identification of malicious domains that infected host access
(or may access). We infer a host or domain to be malicious (or benign), with the belief prop-
agation algorithm applied to a bipartite graph generated from a huge dataset of HTTP and
DHCP logs and to a campus DNS dataset. We justify the parameters chosen for inducing
correct beliefs and present tradeoffs for variants of those parameters. With a small ground
truth for domains, our results verify labelling of graph nodes with high detection rates for
low false positive rates and low false discovery rates. We also present a modification where
the classified domains may be used as a source of information resulting in an improved per-
formance. For future work, we plan to experiment with several variations of our approach.
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We plan to focus on problem of identifying sub-categories of malicious domains or hosts
such as whether an infected host is part of DDoS botnet, spews only spam, or is involved
in other malicious activity. We also plan to evaluate a real-time approach by choosing
parameters for faster convergence along with splitting huge bipartite graph into smaller
components and thus distributing belief propagation analysis to independent components.
Another interesting application of our technique is using belief propagation to determine
advertisement networks through inference from white-listed or popular domains. In addi-
tion, we plan to use several (non-) linear prior assignment functions to evaluate the effect
on performance.
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